Rachel v. William Walker
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Court say that the person who takes his slave into said Territory and by lenght of residence there
indicates an intention of making that place his residence and the residence of his slave also
and thereby induces a Jury to believe that fact also by such residence declares his slave free.

And the Court say in the case of La Grange vs.MenardMenard that the Court will raise other
exceptions than those expressed in the Ordinance: the case of La Grange was one where the own
er lived in IllinoisIllinois and had his slave employed in MissouriMissouri and the slave made occasional
visits to his Master's house in IllinoisIllinois the Court declared this did not work on Emancipation

The case of JuliaJulia vs. McHinney decided by this Court in 1833 goes forther in detail as
to the exception which necessity may create than any other. 3 Vol. M.R. 270.

That case decides that when a person does not intend to introduce slavery in the
State of IllinoisIllinois but does in fact introduce it he will forfeit his slave unless he can shew some
reasonable necessity. there is in the Constitution of IllinoisIllinois a provision of the same import of
the provision in the Ordinance under this prohibition in the IllinoisIllinois constitution JuliaJulia was
declared free. In all the cases decided by this Court it is admitted that the people of the
United StatesUnited States have a right to pass through any of the districts where slavery is prohibited with
their slaves and while they justly retain the character of Emigrants passing through
the Country the fact that they have in their possession when so passing slaves does not eman
cipate them under the ordinance. and whether such owner has lost such character for the time
being depends on evidence to be adduced on the trial; Now if it could be proved that he
declared his design was to reside there this would be sufficient evidence that what he did
was done in view of that intent; but if he should declare that it was not his design to re-
side there and yet should do so then the fact would be stronger than the words.

In the case of JuliaJulia many cases are put to shew that an owner of a slave might
remain in the Country for a considerable lenght of time without working a for feiture of his
right to the slavce; the Court say in that case, if any accident should happen to the Emigrant
which in ordinary cases would make it reasonable and prudent for him to suspend his journey
for a short time we think he might do so without incurring a forfeiture if he resume his
journey as soon as may be: Something more than the mere convenience or cese of the Emigrant
ought to intervene to save him from a forfeiture. Something of the nature of necessity
should or ought to exist before he ought to be exempt. if swollen stranes of water which
could not be crossed without danger serious sickness of the family broken wagons and
the like, these things if they exist would be good causes of delay if the journey be resumed
as soon as they are removed.

It may be that the language contained in this case has induced the de-
fendant claiming under StocktonStockton to expect and hope his case would come within the words

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of the opinion is not within its reason.

In that case the Court say there should be something like necessity existing to
justify the owner of a slave to keep such slave in the Country so as to save a forfeiture. the
counsel insist on a necessity as regards the owner to stay and abide in the MissouriMissouri territo-
ry and MichiganMichigan for more than two years and during all that time to keep the plaintiff
there as a slave

It is said the officer was under orders from the government to remain where
he did and therefore a necessity existed which brings him within thereason of the decision,
in Julia's case.

This plea of necessity is well answered by Mr. SpaldingSpalding for the plaintiff which
answer is that though it be true that the officer was bound to remain where he did during
all the time he was there yet no authority of law or the government compelled him to keep
the plaintiff there as a slave. This answer is complete as we think. shall it be said that
because an officer of the army owns slaves in VirginiaVirginia, that when as officer and soldier
he is required to take command of a post in the non-slave holding States or TerritoriesTerritories
he thereby has a right to take with him as many slaves as will suit his interests or con-
venience. it surely cannot be the law. it thus be true then it is also true that the convenience or
supposed convenience of the officer repeals as to him and others who have the same character
the Ordinance and the act of 1821 admitting MissouriMissouri into the Union and also the prohibiti-
ons of the several laws and constitutions of the non slave holding states. But it is said in this
case that the plaintiff was only employed as a body servant to induce the belief of the fact
that the service she performed was necessary or perhaps to establish the fact that the officer
has a right to a family servant. we are yet to learn that the law which gives to officers
servants of a certain sort authorise such officers to hold slaves in lieu of such servants and in
places forbidden by the ordinance. In this case the officer lived in the MissouriMissouri territory at
the time he bought the slave, he sent to a slave holding Country and procured her, this
was his voluntary act done without any other reason than that of convenience and he and
those claiming under him must be holden to abide the consequence of introducing slavery
both in MissouriMissouri Territory and MichiganMichigan contrary to law.

The judgment of the Circuit CourtCircuit Court is reversed. the cause is remanded for a new

M. McGirk

George Tompkins

R. WashR Wash .