This was an action instituted by Dred ScottDred Scott against Irene EmersonIrene Emerson , the wife and administratrix of , to try his right to freedom. His claim is based upon the fact that his late master held him in servitude in the , and also in that territory ceded by to the , under the name of , not included within the limits of the .
It appears that his late master was a surgeon in the army of the , and during his continuance in the service, was stationed at , a military post in the , and at Fort SnellingFort Snelling, also a military post in the territory of the , above described, at both of which places ScottScott was detained in servitude -- at one place from the year 1834, until April or May, 1836; at the other from the period last mentioned until the year 1838. The jury was instructed, in effect, that if such were the facts, they would find for ScottScott . He, accordingly, obtained a verdict.
The defendant moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection by the court, which being denied to her, she sued out this writ of error.
Cases of this kind are not strangers in our courts. Persons have been frequently here adjudged to be entitled to their freedom, on the ground that their masters held them in slavery in territories or States in which that institution was prohibited. From the first case decided in our courts, it might be inferred that this result was brought about by a presumed assent of the master, from the fact of having voluntarily taken his slave to a place where the relation of master and slave did not exist. But subsequent cases base the right "to exact the forfeiture of emancipation," as they term it, on the ground, it would seem, that it is the duty of the courts of this State to carry into effect the constitution and laws of other States and territories, regardless of the rights, the policy or the institutions of the people of this State.
The States of this Union, although associated for some purposes of government, yet in relation to their municipal concerns have always been regarded as foreign to each other. The law of descents of one State is not regarded in another, in the distribution of the estates of deceased persons. So of the law of wills, administrations, judicial proceedings, and all other matters of mere internal police. The courts of one State do not take judicial notice of the laws of other States. They, when it is necessary to be shown what they are, must be pr oved like other facts. So of the laws of the , enacted for the mere purpose of governing a territory. These laws have no force in the States of the Union; they are local and relate to the municipal affairs of the territory. Their effect is confined within its limits, and beyond those limits they have no more effect, in any State, than the municipal laws of one State would have in any other State; Cohens v. State of VirginiaState of Virginia 6 Wheat. 264. This doctrine is declared and maintained, not only with respect to nations strictly foreign to each other, but also to the several States of this Union. Every State has the right of determining how far, in a spirit of comity, it will respect the laws of other States. Those laws have no intrinsic right to be enforced beyond the limits of the State for which they were enacted. The respect allowed them will depend altogether on their conformity to the policy of our institutions. No State is bound to carry into effect enactments conceived in a spirit hostile to that which pervades her own laws. In the Conflict of Laws, sec. 36, it is said: "but of the nature, and extent and utility of this recognition of foreign laws, respecting the state and condition of persons, every nation must judge for itself, and certainly is not bound to recognize them, when they would be prejudicial to their own interests. It is, in the strictest sense a matter of the comity of nations, and not of any absolute paramount obligation, superceding all discretion on the subject." So in sec. 32, it is said, "it is difficult to conceive upon what ground a claim can be rested, to give any municipal laws an extra-territorial effect, when those laws are prejudicial to the rights of other nations or to those of their subjects; it would at once annihilate the sovereignty and equality of every nation, which should be called upon to recognize and enforce them, or to compel it to desert its own proper interests and duty to its own subjects in favor of strangers, who were regardless of both. A claim so naked of any principle or just authority to support it, is wholly inadmissible."
Again, "the comity of nations is derived altogether from the voluntary consent of the State by which it is shown, and is inadmissible, when it is contrary to its known policy or prejudicial to its interests.
Now, are we prepared to say, that we shall suffer these laws to be enforced in our courts? On almost three sides the is surrounded by free soil. If one of our slaves touch that soil with his master's assent, he becomes entitled to his freedom. Considering the numberless instances in which those living along an extreme frontier would have occasion to occupy their slaves beyond our boundary, how hard would it be if our courts should liberate all the slaves who should thus be employed! How unreasonable to ask it! If a master sends his slave to hunt his horses or cattle beyond the boundary, shall he thereby be liberated? But our courts, it is said, will not go so far. If not go the entire length, why go at all? The obligation to enforce to the proper
This language is used when speaking in reference to the legislation of other States of the Union. It is conceived that there is no ground to presume or to impute any volition to Dr. EmersonEmerson , that his slave should have his freedom. He was ordered by superior authority to the posts where his slave was detained in servitude, and in obedience to that authority, he repaired to them with his servant, as he very naturally supposed he had a right to do. To construe this into an assent to his slave's freedom would be doing violence to his acts. Nothing but a persuasion that it is a duty to enforce the foreign law as though it was one of our own, could ever induce a court to put such a construction on his conduct. The present attitude of the parties to this suit is conclusive, as to an actual consent, and nothing but the foreign law or the aid derived from it, can raise an implied one. If the had prohibited slavery within her limits, and our courts were called upon to execute that law, some zeal might be tolerated in our efforts to execute it; but while slavery obtains here, there is no consideration which would warrant us in going such lengths against our own citizens, for having permitted their slaves to remain in the territory of a State where slavery is prohibited.
In States and Kingdoms in which slavery is the least countenanced, and where there is a constant struggle against its existence, it is admitted law, that if a slave accompanies his master to a country in which
Conflict of Laws, says, "it has been solemnly decided that the law of abhors and will not endure the existence of slavery within the nation, and consequently, so soon as a slave lands in , he becomes ipso facto, a free man, and discharged from the state of servitude; and there is no doubt that the same principle pervades the common law of the non-slaveholding States in ; that is to say, foreign slaves would no longer be deemed such after their removal thither." But he continues, "it is a very different question how far the original state of slavery might re-attach upon the party, if he should return to the country by whose laws he was declared to be and was held as a slave;"
sec. 95, 6. In the case of the Commonwealth of MassachusettsMassachusetts v. Ames , 18 Pick., Judge ShawShaw , although declining to give an express opinion upon this question, intimates very clearly that if the slave returns to his former country where slavery obtains, his condition would not be changed. In the case of GrahamGraham v. StraderStrader , 5 Mon. 183, the court of Appeals in held, that the owner of a slave who resides in , and who permits his slave to go to in charge of an agent for a temporary purpose, does not forfeit his right of property in such slave.
An attempt has been made to show, that the comity extended to the laws of other States, is a matter of discretion, to be determined by the courts of that State in which the laws are proposed to be enforced. If it is a matter of discretion, that discretion must be controlled by circumstances. Times now are not as they were when the former decisions on this subject were made. Since then not only individuals, but States, have been possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in the pursuit of measures, whose inevitable consequence must be the overthrow and destruction of our government. Under such circumstances it does not behoove the to show the least countenance to any measure which might gratify this spirit. She is willing to assume her full responsibility for the existence of slavery within her limits, nor does she seek to share or divide it with others. Although we may, for our own sakes, regret that the avarice and hard-heartedness of the progenitors of those who are
As to the consequences of slavery, they are much more hurtful to the master than the slave. There is no comparison between the slave of the and the cruel, uncivilized negro in . When the condition of our slaves is contrasted with the state of their miserable race in ; when their civilization, intelligence and instruction in religious truths are considered, and the means now employed to restore them to the country from which they have been torn, bearing with them the blessings of civilized life, we are almost persuaded that the introduction of slavery amongst us was, in the providences of God, who makes the evil passions of men subservient to his own glory, a means of placing that unhappy race within the pale of civilized nations.
Judge Ryland concurring, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.