This case is before us on a writ of error from the Circuit CourtCircuit Court for the district of MissouriMissouri.
An action of trespass was brought, which charges the defendant with an assault and imprisonment of the plaintiff, and also of , his wife, ElizaEliza and LizzieLizzie , his two children, on the ground that they were his slaves, which was without right on his part, and against law.
The defendant filed a plea in abatement, "that said causes of action, and each and every of them, if any such accrued to the said Dred ScottDred Scott , accrued out of the jurisdiction of this court, and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the courts of the , for that to wit, said plaintiff, Dred ScottDred Scott , is not a citizen of the , as alleged in his declaration, because he is a negro of African descent, his ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as negro slaves; and this the said SandfordSanford is ready to verify; wherefore he prays judgment whether the court can or will take further cognizance of the action aforesaid."
To this a demurrer was filed, which, on argument, was sustained by the court, the plea in abatement being held insufficient; the defendant was ruled to plead over. Under this rule he pleaded: 1. Not guilty; 2. That Dred ScottDred Scott was a negro slave, the property of the defendant; and 3. That HarrietHarriet , the wife, and ElizaEliza and LizzieLizzie , the daughters of the plaintiff, were the lawful slaves of the defendant.
Issue was joined on the first plea, and replications of de injuria were filed to the other pleas.
The parties agreed to the following facts: In the year 1834, the plaintiff was a negro slave belonging to Dr. EmersonEmerson , who was a surgeon in the army of the . In that year, Dr. EmersonEmerson took the plaintiff from the to the post of , in the , and held him there as a slave until the month of April or May, 1836. At the time last mentioned, Dr. EmersonEmerson removed the plaintiff from to the military post at , situate on , in the territory known as , acquired by the United StatesUnited States of , and . Dr. EmersonEmerson held the plaintiff in slavery, at , from the last-mentioned date until the year 1838.
In the year 1835, HarrietHarriet , who is named in the second count of the plaintiff's declaration, was the negro slave of , who belonged to the army of the . In that year, took HarrietHarriet to , a military post situated as hereinbefore stated, and kept her there as a slave until the year 1836, and then sold and delivered her as a slave, at , unto Dr. EmersonEmerson , who held her in slavery, at that place, until the year 1838.
In the year 1836, the plaintiff and HarrietHarriet were married at , with the consent of Dr. EmersonEmerson , who claimed to be their master and owner. ElizaEliza and LizzieLizzie , named in the third count of the plaintiff's declaration, are the fruit of that marriage. ElizaEliza is about fourteen years old, and was born on board the steamboat Gipsey, . Lizzie is about seven years old, and was born in the , at the military post called .
In the year 1838, Dr. EmersonEmerson removed the plaintiff and said HarrietHarriet and their daughter ElizaEliza from to the , where they have ever since resided.
Before the commencement of the suit, Dr. EmersonEmerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff, HarrietHarriet , ElizaEliza , and LizzieLizzie , to the defendant, as slaves, and he has ever since claimed to hold them as slaves.
At the times mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration, the defendant, claiming to be the owner, laid his hands upon said plaintiff, HarrietHarriet , ElizaEliza , and LizzieLizzie , and imprisoned them; doing in this respect, however, no more than he might lawfully do, if they were of right his slaves at such times.
In the first place, the plea to the jurisdiction is not before us, on this writ of error. A demurrer to the plea was sustained, which ruled the plea bad, and the defendant, on leave, pleaded over.
The decision on the demurrer was in favor of the plaintiff; and as the plaintiff prosecutes this writ of error, he does not complain of the decision on the demurrer. The defendant might have complained of this decision, as against him, and have prosecuted a writ of error, to reverse it. But as the case, under the instruction of the court to the jury, was decided in his favor, of course he had no ground of complaint.
But it is said, if the court, on looking at the record, shall clearly perceive that the Circuit CourtCircuit Court had no jurisdiction, it is a ground for the dismissal of the case. This may be characterized as rather a sharp practice, and one which seldom, if ever, occurs. No case was cited in the argument as authority, and not a single case precisely in point is recollected in our reports. The pleadings do not show a want of jurisdiction. This want of jurisdiction can only be ascertained by a judgment on the demurrer to the special plea. No such case, it is believed, can be cited. But if this rule of practice is to be applied in this case, and the plaintiff in error is required to answer and maintain as well the points ruled in his favor, as to show the error of those ruled against him, he has more than an ordinary duty to perform. Under such circumstances, the want of jurisdiction in the Circuit CourtCircuit Court must be so clear as not to admit of doubt. Now, the plea which raises the question of jurisdiction, in my judgment, is radically defective. The gravamen of the plea is this: "That the plaintiff is a negro of African descent, his ancestors being of pure African blood, and were brought into this country, and sold as negro slaves."
There is no averment in this plea which shows or conduces to show an inability in the plaintiff to sue in the Circuit CourtCircuit Court . It does not allege that the plaintiff had his domicil in any other State, nor that he is not a free man in . He is averred to have had a negro ancestry, but this does not show that he is not a citizen of , within the meaning of the act of CongressCongress authorizing him to sue in the Circuit CourtCircuit Court . It has never been held necessary, to constitute a citizen within the act, that he should have the qualifications of an elector. Females and minors may sue in the Federal courts, and so may any individual who has a permanent domicil in the State under whose laws his rights are protected, and to which he owes allegiance.
Being born under our Constitution and laws, no naturalization is required, as one of foreign birth, to make him a citizen. The most general and appropriate definition of the term citizen is "a freeman." Being a freeman, and having his domicil in a State different from that of the defendant, he is a citizen within the act of CongressCongress , and the courts of the Union are open to him.
It has often been held, that the jurisdiction, as regards parties, can only be exercised between citizens of different States, and that a mere residence is not sufficient; but this has been said to distinguish a temporary from a permanent residence.
To constitute a good plea to the jurisdiction, it must negative those qualities and rights which enable an individual to sue in the Federal courts. This has not been done; and on this ground the plea was defective, and the demurrer was properly sustained. No implication can aid a plea in abatement or in bar; it must be complete in itself; the facts stated, if true, must abate or bar the right of the plaintiff to sue. This is not the character of the above plea. The facts stated, if admitted, are not inconsistent with other facts, which may be presumed, and which bring the plaintiff within the act of CongressCongress .
The pleader has not the boldness to allege that the plaintiff is a slave, as that would assume against him the matter in controversy, and embrace the entire merits of the case in a plea to the jurisdiction. But beyond the facts set out in the plea, the court, to sustain it, must assume the plaintiff to be a slave, which is decisive on the merits. This is a short and an effectual mode of deciding the cause; but I am yet to learn that it is sanctioned by any known rule of pleading.
The defendant's counsel complain, that if the court take jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff is free, the assumption is against the right of the master. This argument is easily answered. In the first place, the plea does not show him to be a slave; it does not follow that a man is not free whose ancestors were slaves. The reports of the Supreme Court of MissouriSupreme Court of Missouri show that this assumption has many exceptions; and there is no averment in the plea that the plaintiff is not within them.
By all the rules of pleading, this is a fatal defect in the plea. If there be doubt, what rule of construction has been established in the slave States? In JacobJacob versusv.Sharp , (Meigs's Rep., TennesseeTennessee, 114,) the court held, when there was doubt as to the construction of a will which emancipated a slave, "it must be construed to be subordinate to the higher and more important right of freedom."
No injustice can result to the master, from an exercise of jurisdiction in this cause. Such a decision does not in any degree affect the merits of the case; it only enables the plaintiff to assert his claims to freedom before this tribunal. If the jurisdiction be ruled against him, on the ground that he is a slave, it is decisive of his fate.
It has been argued that, if a colored person be made a citizen of a State, he cannot
sue in the Federal court. The Constitution declares that Federal jurisdiction
"may be exercised between citizens of different States," and the same is provided
the act of 1789. The above argument is properly met by saying that the Constitution was intended to be a practical instrument; and where its language is too plain to be misunderstood, the argument ends."
In Chirae versusv.Chirae , (2 Wheat., 261; 4 CurtisCurtis , 99,) this court says: "That the power of naturalization is exclusively in CongressCongress does not seem to be, and certainly ought not to be, controverted." No person can legally be made a citizen of a State, and consequently a citizen of the , of foreign birth, unless he be naturalized under the acts of Congress . Congress has power "to establish a uniform rule of naturalization."
It is a power which belongs exclusively to CongressCongress , as intimately connected with our Federal relations. A State may authorize foreigners to hold real estate within its jurisdiction, but it has no power to naturalize foreigners, and give them the rights of citizens. Such a right is opposed to the acts of CongressCongress on the subject of naturalization, and subversive of the Federal powers. I regret that any countenance should be given from this bench to a practice like this in some of the States, which has no warrant in the Constitution.
In the argument, it was said that a colored citizen would not be an agreeable member of society. This is more a matter of taste than of law. Several of the States have admitted persons of color to the right of suffrage, and in this view have recognised them as citizens; and this has been done in the slave as well as the free States. On the question of citizenship, it must be admitted that we have not been very fastidious. Under the late treaty with , we have made citizens of all grades, combinations, and colors. The same was done in the admission of and . No one ever doubted, and no court ever held, that the people of these TerritoriesTerritories did not become citizens under the treaty. They have exercised all the rights of citizens, without being naturalized under the acts of CongressCongress .
There are several important principles involved in this case, which have been argued, and which may be considered under the following heads:
In the course of my judicial duties, I have had occasion to consider and decide several of the above points.
1. As to the locality of slavery. The civil law throughout the Continent of , it is believed,
without an exception, is, that slavery can exist only within the territory where it is established;
and that, if a slave escapes, or is carried beyond such territory, his master cannot reclaim him,
unless by virtue of some express stipulation. (
Grotius, lib. 2, chap. 15, 5, 1;
lib. 10, chap. 10, 2, 1;
Wicqueposts Ambassador, lib. 1, p. 418; 4 MartinMartin , 385; Case of the Creole in the House of Lords, 1842;
1 Phillimore on International Law, 316, 335.)
There is no nation in which considers itself bound to return to his master a fugitive slave, under the civil law or the law of nations. On the contrary, the slave is held to be free where there is no treaty obligation, or compact in some other form, to return him to his master. The RomanRoman law did not allow freedom to be sold. An ambassador or any other public functionary could not take a slave to , , or any other country of , without emancipating him. A number of slaves escaped from a plantation, and were received on board of ship by ; by the King's Bench, they were held to be free. (2 Barn. and Cres., 440.)
In the great and leading case of Prigg versusv.The State of PennsylvaniaPennsylvania , (16 PetersPeters , 594;
14 CurtisCurtis , 421,) this court say that, by the general
law of nations, no nation is bound to recognise the state of slavery, as found within its
territorial dominions, where it is in opposition to its own policy and institutions, in
favor of the subjects of other nations where slavery is organized. If it does it, it is
as a matter of comity, and not as a matter of international right. The state of slavery
is deemed to be a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of the
territorial laws. This was fully recognised in SomersettSomersett 's case,
Lafft's Rep., 1; 20 Howell's State Trials, 79,) which was decided before the American Revolution.
There was some contrariety of opinion among the judges on certain points ruled in Prigg 's case, but there was none in regard to the great principle, that slavery is limited to the range of the laws under which it is sanctioned.
No case in appears to have been more thoroughly examined than that of SomersettSomersett . The judgment pronounced by Lord MansfieldMansfield was the judgment of the Court of King's Bench. The cause was argued at great length, and with great ability, by HargraveHargrave and others, who stood among the most eminent counsel in . It was held under advisement from term to term, and a due sense of its importance was felt and expressed by the Bench.
In giving the opinion of the court, Lord MansfieldMansfield said:
"The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself, from whence it was created, is erased from the memory; it is of a nature that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law."
He referred to the contrary opinion of Lord Hardwicke , in October, 1749, as Chancellor: "That he and , when Attorney and Solicitor General, were of opinion that no such claim, as here presented, for freedom, was valid."
The weight of this decision is sought to be impaired, from the terms in which it was described by the exuberant imagination of . The words of Lord MansfieldMansfield , in giving the opinion of the court, were such as were fit to be used by a great judge, in a most important case. It is a sufficient answer to all objections to that judgment, that it was pronounced before the Revolution, and that it was considered by this court as the highest authority. For near a century, the decision in SomersettSomersett 's case has remained the law of . The case of the slave Grace , decided by Lord StowellStowell in 1827, does not, as has been supposed, overrule the judgment of Lord MansfieldMansfield . Lord StowellStowell held that, during the residence of the slave in , "No dominion, authority, or coercion, can be exercised over him." Under another head, I shall have occasion to examine the opinion in the case of Grace .
To the position, that slavery can only exist except under the authority of law, it is objected, that in few if in any instances has it been established by statutory enactment. This is no answer to the doctrine laid down by the court. Almost all the principles of the common law had their foundation in usage. Slavery was introduced into the colonies of this country by at an early period of their history, and it was protected and cherished, until it became incorporated into the colonial policy. It is immaterial whether a system of slavery was introduced by express law, or otherwise, if it have the authority of law. There is no slave State where the institution is not recognised and protected by statutory enactments and judicial decisions. Slaves are made property by the laws of the slave States, and as such are liable to the claims of creditors; they descend to heirs, are taxed, and in the South they are a subject of commerce.
In the case of Rankin versusv.LydiaLydia , (2 A. K. Marshall's Rep.,) Judge Mills , speaking for the Court of Appeals of KentuckyKentucky, says: "In deciding the question, (of slavery,) we disclaim the influence of the general principles of liberty, which we all admire, and conceive it ought to be decided by the law as it is, and not as it ought to be. Slavery is sanctioned by the laws of this State, and the right to hold slaves under our municipal regulations is unquestionable. But we view this as a right existing by positive law of a municipal character, without foundation in the law of nature, or the unwritten and common law."
I will now consider the relation which the Federal Government bears to slavery in the States:
Slavery is emphatically a State institution. In
the ninth section of the first article of the Constitution, it is provided "that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the CongressCongress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person."
In the Convention, it was proposed by a committee of eleven to limit the importation
of slaves to the year 1800, when moved to extend the time to the year
1808. This motion was carriedâ,
, and , voting in the affirmative;
and , , and , in the negative. In opposition to the
motion, said: "Twenty years will produce all the mischief that can be
apprehended from the liberty to import slaves; so long a term will be more
dishonorable to the American character than to say nothing about it in the
The provision in regard to the slave trade shows clearly that CongressCongress considered slavery a State institution, to be continued and regulated by its individual sovereignty; and to conciliate that interest, the slave trade was continued twenty years, not as a general measure, but for the "benefit of such States as shall think proper to encourage it."
In the case of Groves versusv.Slaughter , (15 PetersPeters , 449; 14 CurtisCurtis , 137,) Messrs. and contended that, under the commercial power, CongressCongress had a right to regulate the slave trade among the several States; but the court held that CongressCongress had no power to interfere with slavery as it exists in the States, or to regulate what is called the slave trade among them. If this trade were subject to the commercial power, it would follow that CongressCongress could abolish or establish slavery in every State of the Union.
The only connection which the Federal Government holds with slaves in a State, arises from that provision of the Constitution which declares that "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."
This being a fundamental law of the Federal Government, it rests mainly for its execution, as has been held, on the judicial power of the Union; and so far as the rendition of fugitives from labor has become a subject of judicial action, the Federal obligation has been faithfully discharged.
In the formation of the Federal Constitution, care was taken to confer no power on the Federal Government to interfere with this institution in the States. In the provision respecting the slave trade, in fixing the ratio of representation, and \providing for the reclamation of fugitives from labor, slaves were referred to as persons, and in no other respect are they considered in the Constitution.
We need not refer to the mercenary spirit which introduced the infamous traffic in slaves, to show the degradation of negro slavery in our country. This system was imposed upon our colonial settlements by the mother country, and it is due to truth to say that the commercial colonies and States were chiefly engaged in the traffic. But we know as a historical fact, that , that great and good man, a leading member in the Federal Convention, was solicitous to guard the language of that instrument so as not to convey the idea that there could be property in man.
I prefer the lights of , , and , as a means of construing the Constitution in all its bearings, rather than to look behind that period, into a traffic which is now declared to be piracy, and punished with death by ChristianChristian nations. I do not like to draw the sources of our domestic relations from so dark a ground. Our independence was a great epoch in the history of freedom; and while I admit the Government was not made especially for the colored race, yet many of them were citizens of the States, and exercised the rights of suffrage when the Constitution was adopted, and it was not doubted by any intelligent person that its tendencies would greatly ameliorate their condition.
Many of the States, on the adoption of the Constitution, or shortly afterward, took measures to abolish slavery within their respective jurisdictions; and it is a well-known fact that a belief was cherished by the leading men, South as well as North, that the institution of slavery would gradually decline, until it would become extinct. The increased value of slave labor, in the culture of cotton and sugar, prevented the realization of this expectation. Like all other communities and States, the South were influenced by what they considered to be their own interests.
But if we are to turn our attention to the dark ages of the world, why confine our view to colored slavery? On the same principles, white men were made slaves. All slavery has its origin in power, and is against right.
The power of CongressCongress to establish Territorial Governments, and to prohibit the introduction of slavery therein, is the next point to be considered.
After the cession of western territory by and other States, to the , the public attention was directed to the best mode of disposing of it for the general benefit. While in attendence on the Federal Convention, Mr. MadisonMadison , in a letter to , dated the 22d April, 1787, says: "CongressCongress are deliberating on the plan most eligible for disposing of the western territory not yet surveyed. Some alteration will probably be made in the ordinance on that subject." And in the same letter he says: "The inhabitants of the IllinoisIllinois complain of the land jobbers, &c., who are purchasing titles among them. Those of St. Vincent's complain of the defective criminal and civil justice among them, as well as of military protection." And on the next day he writes to : "The government of the settlements on the IllinoisIllinois and Wabash is a subject very perplexing in itself, and rendered more so by our ignorance of the many circumstances on which a right judgment depends. The inhabitants at those places claim protection against the savages, and some provision for both civil and criminal justice."
In May, 1787, Mr. submitted to the Federal Convention certain propositions, as the basis of a Federal Government, among which was the following:
"Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the , whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the National Legislature less than the whole."
Afterward, submitted to the Convention, in order to be referred to the committee of detail, the following powers, as proper to be added to those of general legislation: "To dispose of the unappropriated lands of the . To institute temporary Governments for new States arising therein. To regulate affairs with the Indians, as well within as without the limits of the United StatesUnited States."
Other propositions were made in reference to the same subjects, which it would be tedious to enumerate. Mr. Gouverneur proposed the following:
"The Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the ; and nothing in this Constitution contained shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims either of the or of any particular State."
This was adopted as a part of the Constitution, with two verbal alterationsâ CongressCongress was substituted for Legislature, and the word either was stricken out.
In the organization of the new Government, but little revenue for a series of years
was expected from commerce. The public lands were considered as the principal resource
of the country for the payment of the Revolutionary debt. Direct taxation was the means
relied on to pay the current expenses of the Government. The short period that occurred
between the cession of western lands to the Federal Government by and other
States, and the adoption of the Constitution, was sufficient to show the necessity of
a proper land system and a temporary Government. This was clearly seen by propositions
and remarks in the Federal Convention, some of which are above cited, by the passage of
the Ordinance of 1787, and the adoption of that instrument by CongressCongress , under the Constitution, which gave to it validity.
It will be recollected that the deed of cession of western territory was made to the by in 1784, and that it required the territory ceded to be laid out into States, that the land should be disposed of for the common benefit of the States, and that all right, title, and claim, as well of soil as of jurisdiction, were ceded; and this was the form of cession from other States.
On the 13th of July,
the Ordinance of 1787 was passed, "for the government of the ," with but one dissenting vote. This instrument provided there should be organized in the territory not less than three nor more than five States, designating their boundaries. It was passed while the Federal Convention was in session, about two months before the Constitution was adopted by the Convention. The members of the Convention must therefore have been well acquainted with the provisions of the Ordinance. It provided for a temporary Government, as initiatory to the formation of State Governments. Slavery was prohibited in the territory.
Can any one suppose that the eminent men of the Federal Convention could have
overlooked or neglected a matter so vitally important to the country, in the
organization of temporary Governments for the vast territory northwest of the
the 3d section of the 4th article of the Constitution, they did make provision for the admission of new States, the sale of the public lands, and the temporary Government of the territory. Without a temporary Government, new States could not have been formed, nor could the public lands have been sold.
third section were before us now for consideration for the first time, under the facts stated, I could not hesitate to say there was adequate legislative power given in it. The power to make all needful rules and regulations is a power to legislate. This no one will controvert, as CongressCongress cannot make "rules and regulations," except by legislation. But it is argued that the word territory is used as synonymous with the word land; and that the rules and regulations of CongressCongress are limited to the disposition of lands and other property belonging to the . That this is not the true construction of the section appears from the fact that in the first line of the section "the power to dispose of the public lands" is given expressly, and, in addition, to make all needful rules and regulations. The power to dispose of is complete in itself, and requires nothing more. It authorizes CongressCongress to use the proper means within its discretion, and any further provision for this purpose would be a useless verbiage. As a composition, the Constitution is remarkably free from such a charge.
In the discussion of the power of CongressCongress to govern a Territory, in the case of the Atlantic Insurance Company versusv.Canter , (1 PetersPeters , 511; 7 CurtisCurtis , 685,) Chief Justice MarshallMarshall , speaking for the court, said, in regard to the people of , "they do not, however, participate in political power; they do not share in the Government till shall become a State; in the mean time, continues to be a Territory of the , governed by virtue of that clause in the Constitution which empowers CongressCongress 'to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory or other property belonging to the .'"
And he adds, "perhaps the power of governing a Territory belonging to the , which has not, by becoming a State, acquired the means of self-government, may result necessarily from the fact that it is not within the jurisdiction of any particular State, and is within the power and jurisdiction of the . The right to govern may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory; whichever may be the source whence the power is derived, the possession of it is unquestioned." And in the close of the opinion, the court say, "in legislating for them [the Territories,] Congress exercises the combined powers of the General and State Governments."
Some consider the opinion to be loose and inconclusive; others, that it is obiter dicta; and the last sentence is objected to as recognising absolute power in CongressCongress over TerritoriesTerritories. The learned and eloquent Wirt , who, in the argument of a cause before the court, had occasion to cite a few sentences from an opinion of the Chief Justice, observed, "no one can mistake the style, the words so completely match the thought."
I can see no want of precision in the language of the Chief Justice; his meaning
cannot be mistaken. He states, first, the
third section as giving power to CongressCongress to govern the TerritoriesTerritories, and two other grounds from which the power may also be implied. The objection seems to be, that the Chief Justice did not say which of the grounds stated he considered the source of the power. He did not specifically state this, but he did say, "whichever may be the source whence the power is derived, the possession of it is unquestioned." No opinion of the court could have been expressed with a stronger emphasis; the power in CongressCongress is unquestioned. But those who have undertaken to criticise the opinion, consider it without authority, because the Chief Justice did not designate specially the power. This is a singular objection. If the power be unquestioned, it can be a matter of no importance on which ground it is exercised.
The opinion clearly was not obiter dicta. The turning point in the case was, whether CongressCongress had power to authorize the Territorial Legislature of to pass the law under which the Territorial court was established, whose decree was brought before this court for revision. The power of CongressCongress , therefore, was the point in issue.
The word "territory," according to , "means land, country, a district of country under a temporary Government." The words "territory or other property," as used, do imply, from the use of the pronoun other, that territory was used as descriptive of land; but does it follow that it was not used also as descriptive of a district of country? In both of these senses it belonged to the âas land, for the purpose of sale; as territory, for the purpose of government.
But, if it be admitted that the word territory as used means land, and nothing but land, the power of CongressCongress to organize a temporary Government is clear. It has power to make all needful regulations respecting the public lands, and the extent of those "needful regulations" depends upon the direction of CongressCongress , where the means are appropriate to the end, and do not conflict with any of the prohibitions of the Constitution. If a temporary Government be deemed needful, necessary, requisite, or is wanted, CongressCongress has power to establish it. This court says, in McCulloch versusv.The State of MarylandMaryland , (4 Wheat., 316,) "If a certain means to carry into effect any of the powers expressly given by the Constitution to the Government of the Union be an appropriate measure, not prohibited by the Constitution, the degree of its necessity is a question of legislative discretion, not of judicial cognizance."
The power to establish post offices and post roads gives power to CongressCongress to make contracts for the transportation of the mail, and to punish all who commit depredations upon it in its transit, or at its places of distribution. CongressCongress has power to regulate commerce, and, in the exercise of its discretion, to lay an embargo, which suspends commerce; so, under the same power, harbors, lighthouses, breakwaters, &c., are constructed.
Did Chief Justice MarshallMarshall , in saying that CongressCongress governed a Territory, by exercising the combined powers of the Federal and State Governments, refer to unlimited discretion? A Government which can make white men slaves? Surely, such a remark in the argument must have been inadvertently uttered. On the contrary, there is no power in the Constitution by which CongressCongress can make either white or black men slaves. In organizing the Government of a Territory, CongressCongress is limited to meams appropriate to the attainment of the Constitutional object. No powers can be exercised which are prohibited by the Constitution, or which are contrary to its spirit; so that, whether the object may be the protection of the persons and property of purchasers of the public lands, or of communities who have been annexed to the Union by conquest or purchase, they are initiatory to the establishment of State Governments, and no more power can be claimed or exercised than is necessary to the attainment of the end. This is the limitation of all the Federal powers.
But CongressCongress has no power to regulate the internal concerns of a State, as of a Territory; consequently, in providing for the Government of a Territory, to some extent, the combined powers of the Federal and State Governments are necessarily exercised.
If CongressCongress should deem slaves or free colored persons injurious to the population of a free Territory, as conducing to lessen the value of the public lands, or on any other ground connected with the public interest, they have the power to prohibit them from becoming settlers in it. This can be sustained on the ground of a sound national policy, which is so clearly shown in our history by practical results, that it would seem no considerate individual can question it. And, as regards any unfairness of such a policy to our Southern brethren, as urged in the argument, it is only necessary to say that, with one-fourth of the Federal population of the Union, they have in the slave States a larger extent of fertile territory than is included in the free States; and it is submitted, if masters of slaves be restricted from bringing them into free territory, that the restriction on the free citizens of non-slaveholding States, by bringing slaves into free territory, is four times greater than that complained of by the South. But, not only so; some three or four hundred thousand holders of slaves, by bringing them into free territory, impose a restriction on twenty millions of the free States. The repugnancy to slavery would probably prevent fifty or a hundred freemen from settling in a slave Territory, where one slaveholder would be prevented from settling in a free Territory.
This remark is made in answer to the argument urged, that a prohibition of slavery in the free TerritoriesTerritories is inconsistent with the continuance of the Union. Where a Territorial Government is established in a slave Territory, it has uniformly remained in that condition until the people form a State Constitution; the same course where the Territory is free, both parties acting in good faith, would be attended with satisfactory results.
The sovereignty of the Federal Government extends to the entire limits of our territory. Should any foreign power invade our jurisdiction, it would be repelled. There is a law of CongressCongress to punish our citizens for crimes committed in districts of country where there is no organized Government. Criminals are brought to certain TerritoriesTerritories or States, designated in the law, for punishment. Death has been inflicted in and in , on individuals, for murders committed beyond the limit of any organized Territory or State; and no one doubts that such a jurisdiction was rightfully exercised. If there be a right to acquire territory, there necessarily must be an implied power to govern it. When the military force of the Union shall conquer a country, may not CongressCongress provide for the government of such country? This would be an implied power essential to the acquisition of new territory.
This power has been exercised, without doubt of its Constitutionality, over territory acquired by conquest and purchase.
And when there is a large district of country within the , and not within any State Government, if it be necessary to establish a temporary Government to carry out a power expressly vested in CongressCongress âas the disposition of the public landsâmay not such Government be instituted by CongressCongress ? How do we read the Constitution? Is it not a practical instrument?
In such cases, no implication of a power can arise which is inhibited by the Constitution, or which may be against the theory of its construction. As my opinion rests on the third section, these remarks are made as an intimation that the power to establish a temporary Government may arise, also, on the other two grounds stated in the opinion of the court in the insurance case, without weakening the third section.
I would here simply remark, that the Constitution was formed for our whole country. An expansion or contraction of our territory required no change in the fundamental law. When we consider the men who laid the foundation of our Government and carried it into operation, the men who occupied the bench, who filled the halls of legislation and the Chief Magistracy, it would seem, if any question could be settled clear of all doubt, it was the power of CongressCongress to establish Territorial Governments. Slavery was prohibited in the entire , with the approbation of leading men, South and North; but this prohibition was not retained when this ordinance was adopted for the government of Southern TerritoriesTerritories, where slavery existed. In a late republication of a letter of , dated November 27, 1819, speaking of this power of CongressCongress to prohibit slavery in a Territory, he infers there is no such power, from the fact that it has not been exercised. This is not a very satisfactory argument against any power, as there are but few, if any, subjects on which the Constitutional powers of CongressCongress are exhausted. It is true, as states, that CongressCongress , in the act to establish a Government in the , prohibited the importation of slaves into it from foreign parts; but it is equally true, that in the act erecting into two Territories, Congress declared, "it shall not be lawful for any person to bring into , from any port or place within the limits of the , any slave which shall have been imported since 1798, or which may hereafter be imported, except by a citizen of the who settles in the Territory, under the penalty of the freedom of such slave." The inference of , therefore, against the power of CongressCongress , is of no force, as it was founded on a fact supposed, which did not exist.
It is refreshing to turn to the early incidents of our history, and learn wisdom from the
acts of the great men who have gone to their account. I refer to
a report in the House of Representatives , by John Randolph, of , as chairman of a committee, in March, 1803 âfifty-four years ago. From the Convention held at , in , by their President, and from the people of the Territory, a petition was presented to CongressCongress , praying the suspension of the provision which prohibited slavery in that Territory. The report stated "that the rapid population of the sufficiently evinces, in the opinion of your committee, that the labor of slaves is not necessary to promote the growth and settlement of colonies in that region. That this labor, demonstrably the dearest of any, can only be employed to advantage in the cultivation of products more valuable than any known to that quarter of the ; that the committee deem it highly dangerous and inexpedient to impair a provision wisely calculated to promote the happiness and prosperity of the Northwestern country, and to give strength and security to that extensive frontier. In the salutary operation of this sagacious and benevolent restraint, it is believed that the inhabitants will, at no very distant day, find ample remuneration for a temporary privation of labor and of emigration." (
1 vol. State Papers, Public Lands, 160.)
The judicial mind of this country, State and Federal, has agreed on no subject, within its legitimate action, with equal unanimity, as on the power of CongressCongress to establish Territorial Governments. No court, State or Federal, no judge or statesman, is known to have had any doubts on this question for nearly sixty years after the power was exercised. Such Governments have been established .
Great interests have grown up under the Territorial laws over a country more than five times greater in extent than the original thirteen States; and these interests, corporate or otherwise, have been cherished and consolidated by a benign policy, without any one supposing the law-making power had united with the Judiciary, under the universal sanction of the whole country, to usurp a jurisdiction which did not belong to them. Such a discovery at this late date is more extraordinary than anything which has occurred in the judicial history of this or any other country. , under a previous organization, was admitted as a State; but no State can be admitted into the Union which has not been organized under some form of government. Without temporary Governments, our public lands could not have been sold, nor our wildernesses reduced to cultivation, and the population protected; nor could our flourishing States, West and South, have been formed.
What do the lessons of wisdom and experience teach, under such circumstances, if the new light, which has so suddenly and unexpectedly burst upon us, be true? Acquiescence; acquiescence under a settled construction of the Constitution for sixty years, though it may be erroneous; which has secured to the country an advancement and prosperity beyond the power of computation.
An act of , when President, forcibly illustrates this policy. He had made up his opinion that CongressCongress had no power under the Constitution to establish a National Bank. In 1815, CongressCongress passed a bill to establish a bank. He vetoed the bill, on objections other than Constitutional. In his message, he speaks as a wise statesman and Chief Magistrate, as follows:
"Waiving the question of the Constitutional authority of the Legislature to establish an incorporated bank, as being precluded, in my judgment, by the repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution, in acts of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation."
Has this impressive lesson of practical wisdom become lost to the present generation?
If the great and fundamental principles of our Government are never to be settled, there can be no lasting prosperity. The Constitution will become a floating waif on the billows of popular excitement.
The prohibition of slavery , contained in the act admitting that State into the Union, was passed by a vote of 134, in the House of Representatives , to 42. Before signed the act, it was submitted by him to his Cabinet, and they held the restriction of slavery in a Territory to be within the Constitutional powers of CongressCongress . It would be singular, if in 1804CongressCongress had power to prohibit the introduction of slaves in from any other part of the Union, under the penalty of freedom to the slave, if the same power, embodied in the MissouriMissouri compromise, could not be exercised in 1820.
But this law of CongressCongress , which prohibits slavery , is declared to have been null
and void by my brethren. And this opinion is founded mainly, as I understand, on the
distinction drawn between
the ordinance of 1787 and the
MissouriMissouri compromise line. In what does the distinction consist? The ordinance, it is said, was a compact entered into by the confederated States before the adoption of the Constitution; and that in the cession of territory authority was given to establish a Territorial Government.
It is clear that the ordinance did not go into operation by virtue of the authority of the Confederation, but by reason of its modification and adoption by CongressCongress under the Constitution. It seems to be supposed, in the opinion of the court, that the articles of cession placed it on a different footing from territories subsequently acquired. I am unable to perceive the force of this distinction. That the ordinance was intended for the government of the , and was limited to such Territory, is admitted. It was extended to Southern TerritoriesTerritories, with modifications, by acts of CongressCongress , and to some Northern TerritoriesTerritories. But the ordinance was made valid by the act of CongressCongress , and without such act could have been of no force. It rested for its validity on the act of CongressCongress , the same, in my opinion, as the MissouriMissouri compromise line.
If CongressCongress may establish a Territorial Government in the exercise of its discretion, it is a clear principle that a court cannot control that discretion. This being the case, I do not see on what ground the act is held to be void. It did not purport to forfeit property, or take it for public purposes. It only prohibited slavery; in doing which, it followed the ordinance of 1787.
I will now consider the fourth head, which is: "The effect of taking slaves into a State or Territory, and so holding them, where slavery is prohibited."
If the principle laid down in the case of Prigg versusv.The State of PennsylvaniaPennsylvania is to be maintained, and it is certainly to be maintained until overruled, as the law of this court, there can be no difficulty on this point. In that case, the court says: "The state of slavery is deemed to be a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of the territorial laws." If this be so, slavery can exist nowhere except under the authority of law, founded on usage having the force of law, or by statutory recognition. And the court further says: "It is manifest, from this consideration, that if the Constitution had not contained the clause requiring the rendition of fugitives from labor, every non-slaveholding State in the Union would have been at liberty to have declared free all runaway slaves coming within its limits, and to have given them entire immunity and protection against the claims of their masters."
Now, if a slave abscond, he may be reclaimed; but if he accompany his master into a State or Territory where slavery is prohibited, such slave cannot be said to have left the service of his master where his services were legalized. And if slavery be limited to the range of the territorial laws, how can the slave be coerced to serve in a State or Territory, not only without the authority of law, but against its express provisions? What gives the master the right to control the will of his slave? The local law, which exists in some form. But where there is no such law, can the master control the will of the slave by force? Where no slavery exists, the presumption, without regard to color, is in favor of freedom. Under such a jurisdiction, may the colored man be levied on as the property of his master by a creditor? On the decease of the master, does the slave descend to his heirs as property? Can the master sell him? Any one or all of these acts may be done to the slave, where he is legally held to service. But where the law does not confer this power, it cannot be exercised.
Lord MansfieldMansfield held that a slave brought into was free. Lord StowellStowell agreed with Lord MansfieldMansfield in this respect, and that the slave could not be coerced in ; but on her voluntary return to , the place of her slave domicil, her former status attached. The law of did not prohibit slavery, but did not authorize it. The jurisdiction which prohibits slavery is much stronger in behalf of the slave within it, than where it only does not authorize it.
By virtue of what law is it, that a master may take his slave into free territory, and exact from him the duties of a slave? The law of the Territory does not sanction it. No authority can be claimed under the Constitution of the United StatesUnited States, or any law of Congress . Will it be said that the slave is taken as property, the same as other property which the master may own? To this I answer, that colored persons are made property by the law of the State, and no such power has been given to CongressCongress . Does the master carry with him the law of the State from which he removes into the Territory? and does that enable him to coerce his slave in the Territory? Let us test this theory. If this may be done by a master from one slave State, it may be done by a master from every other slave State. This right is supposed to be connected with the person of the master, by virtue of the local law. Is it transferable? May it be negotiated, as a promissory note or bill of exchange? If it be assigned to a man from a free State, may he coerce the slave by virtue of it? What shall this thing be denominated? Is it personal or real property? Or is it an indefinable fragment of sovereignty, which every person carries with him from his late domicil? One thing is certain, that its origin has been very recent, and it is unknown to the laws of any civilized country.
A slave is brought to from one of its islands, where slavery was introduced and maintained by the mother country. Although there is no law prohibiting slavery in , yet there is no law authorizing it; and, for near a century, its courts have declared that the slave there is free from the coercion of the master. Lords MansfieldMansfield and StowellStowell agree upon this point, and there is no dissenting authority.
There is no other description of property which was not protected in , brought from one of its slave islands. Does not this show that property in a human being does not arise from nature or from the common law, but, in the language of this court, "it is a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of the territorial laws?" This decision is not a mere argument, but it is the end of the law, in regard to the extent of slavery. Until it shall be overturned, it is not a point for argument; it is obligatory on myself and my brethren, and on all judicial tribunals over which this court exercises an appellate power.
It is said the TerritoriesTerritories are common property of the States, and that every man has a right to go there with his property. This is not controverted. But the court say a slave is not property beyond the operation of the local law which makes him such. Never was a truth more authoritatively and justly uttered by man. Suppose a master of a slave in a British island owned a million of property in ; would that authorize him to take his slaves with him to ? The Constitution, in express terms, recognises the status of slavery as founded on the municipal law: "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall," &c. Now, unless the fugitive escape from a place where, by the municipal law, he is held to labor, this provision affords no remedy to the master. What can be more conclusive than this? Suppose a slave escape from a Territory where slavery is not authorized by law, can he be reclaimed?
In this case, a majority of the court have said that a slave may be taken by his master into a Territory of the , the same as a horse, or any other kind of property. It is true, this was said by the court, as also many other things, which are of no authority. Nothing that has been said by them, which has not a direct bearing on the jurisdiction of the court, against which they decided, can be considered as authority. I shall certainly not regard it as such. The question of jurisdiction, being before the court, was decided by them authoritatively, but nothing beyond that question. A slave is not a mere chattel. He bears the impress of his Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man; and he is destined to an endless existence.
Under this head I shall chiefly rely on the decisions of the Supreme Courts of the Southern States, and especially of the .
first and second sections of the sixth article of the Constitution of IllinoisIllinois, it is declared that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall hereafter be introduced into this State, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; and in the
second section it is declared that any violation of this article shall effect the emancipation of such person from his obligation to service. In IllinoisIllinois, a right of transit through the State is given the master with his slaves. This is a matter which, as I suppose, belongs exclusively to the State.
The Supreme CourtSupreme Court of IllinoisIllinois, in the case of JarrotJarrot versusv.JarrotJarrot , (2 Gilmer, 7,) said:
"After the conquest of this Territory by , she ceded it to the , and stipulated that the titles and possessions, rights and liberties, of the French settlers, should be guarantied to them. This, it has been contended, secured them in the possession of those negroes as slaves which they held before that time, and that neither CongressCongress nor the Convention had power to deprive them of it; or, in other words, that the ordinance and Constitution should not be so interpreted and understood as applying to such slaves, when it is therein declared that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the , nor in the , otherwise than in the punishment of crimes. But it was held that those rights could not be thus protected, but must yield to the ordinance and Constitution."
The first slave case decided by the Supreme Court of MissouriSupreme Court of Missouri , contained in the reports, was WinnyWinny versusv.WhitesidesWhitesides , (1 MissouriMissouri Rep., 473,) at October term, 1824. It appeared that, more than twenty-five years before, the defendant, with her husband, had removed from to , and brought with them the plaintiff; that they continued to reside in three or four years, retaining the plaintiff as a slave; after which, they removed to , taking her with them.
The court held, that if a slave be detained in until he be entitled to freedom, the right of the owner does not revive when he finds the negro in a slave State.
That when a slave is taken to by his owner, who takes up his residence there, the slave is entitled to freedom.
In the case of Lagrange versusv.ChouteauChouteau , (2 MissouriMissouri Rep., 20, at May term, 1828,) it was decided that the ordinance of 1787 was intended as a fundamental law for those who may choose to live under it, rather than as a penal statute.
That any sort of residence contrived or permitted by the legal owner of the slave, upon the faith of secret trusts or contracts, in order to defeat or evade the ordinance, and thereby introduce slavery de facto, would entitle such slave to freedom.
In JuliaJulia versusv.McKinneyMcKinney ,
(3 MissouriMissouri Rep., 279,) it was held, where a slave was settled in the , but with an intention on the part of the owner to be removed at some
future day, that hiring said slave to a person to labor for one or two days,
and receiving the pay for the hire, the slave is entitled to her freedom, under
the second section of the sixth article of the Constitution of IllinoisIllinois.
RachelRachel versusv.WalkerWalker (4 MissouriMissouri Rep., 350, June term, 1836) is a case involving, in every particular, the principles of the case before us. RachelRachel sued for her freedom; and it appeared that she had been bought as a slave in , by , an officer of the army, taken to , where he was stationed, and she was retained there as a slave a year; and then removed to , taking RachelRachel with him as a slave, where he continued to hold her three years, and then he took her to the , and sold her as a slave.
". That WalkerWalker , the defendant, held RachelRachel under ."
The court said, in this case:
"The officer lived in , at the time he bought the slave; he sent to a slaveholding country and procured her; this was his voluntary act, done without any other reason than that of his convenience; and he and those claiming under him must be holden to abide the consequences of introducing slavery both in and , contrary to law; and on that ground RachelRachel was declared to be entitled to freedom."
In answer to the argument that, as an officer of the army, the master had a right to take his slave into free territory, the court said no authority of law or the Government compelled him to keep the plaintiff there as a slave.
"Shall it be said, that because an officer of the army owns slaves in , that when, as officer and soldier, he is required to take the command of a fort in the non-slaveholding States or TerritoriesTerritories, he thereby has a right to take with him as many slaves as will suit his interests or convenience? It surely cannot be law. If this be true, the court say, then it is also true that the convenience or supposed convenience of the officer repeals, as to him and others who have the same character, the ordinance and the act of 1821, admitting into the Union, and also the prohibition of the several laws and constitutions of the non-slaveholding States."
In WilsonWilson versusv.Melvin , (4 MissouriMissouri R., 592,) it appeared the defendant left with an intention of residing in , taking his negroes with him. After a month's stay in , he took his negroes to , and hired them, then returned to . On these facts, the inferior court instructed the jury that the defendant was a sojourner in . This the Supreme CourtSupreme Court held was error, and the judgment was reversed.
The case of Dred ScottDred Scott versusv.EmersonEmerson (15 MissouriMissouri R., 682, March term, 1852) will now be stated. This case involved the identical question before us, EmersonEmerson having, since the hearing, sold the plaintiff to SandfordSanford , the defendant.
Two of the judges ruled the case, the Chief Justice dissenting. It cannot be improper to state the grounds of the opinion of the court, and of the dissent.
The court say: "Cases of this kind are not strangers in our court. Persons have been frequently here adjudged to be entitled to their freedom, on the ground that their masters held them in slavery in TerritoriesTerritories or States in which that institution is prohibited. From the first case decided in our court, it might be inferred that this result was brought about by a presumed assent of the master, from the fact of having voluntarily taken his slave to a place where the relation of master and slave did not exist. But subsequent cases base the right to 'exact the forfeiture of emancipation,' as they term it, on the ground, it would seem, that it was the duty of the courts of this State to carry into effect the Constitution and laws of other States and TerritoriesTerritories, regardless of the rights, the policy, or the institutions, of the people of this State."
And the court say that the States of the Union, in their municipal concerns, are regarded as foreign to each other; that the courts of one State do not take notice of the laws of other States, unless proved as facts, and that every State has the right to determine how far its comity to other States shall extend; and it is laid down, that when there is no act of manumission decreed to the free State, the courts of the slave States cannot be called to give effect to the law of the free State. Comity, it alleges, between States, depends upon the discretion of both, which may be varied by circumstances. And it is declared by the court, "that times are not as they were when the former decisions on this subject were made." Since then, not only individuals but States have been possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in the pursuit of measures whose inevitable consequence must be the overthrow and destruction of our Government. Under such circumstances, it does not behoove the to show the least countenance to any measure which might gratify this spirit. She is willing to assume her full responsibility for the existence of slavery within her limits, nor does she seek to share or divide it with others.
Chief Justice GambleArchibald Gamble dissented from the other two judges. He says:
"In every slaveholding State in the Union, the subject of emancipation is regulated by statute; and the forms are prescribed in which it shall be effected. Whenever the forms required by the laws of the State in which the master and slave are resident are complied with, the emancipation is complete, and the slave is free. If the right of the person thus emancipated is subsequently drawn in question in another State, it will be ascertained and determined by the law of the State in which the slave and his former master resided; and when it appears that such law has been complied with, the right to freedom will be fully sustained in the courts of all the slaveholding States, although the act of emancipation may not be in the form required by law in which the court sits.
"In all such cases, courts continually administer the law of the country where the right was acquired; and when that law becomes known to the court, it is just as much a matter of course to decide the rights of the parties according to its requirements, as it is to settle the title of real estate situated in our State by its own laws."
This appears to me a most satisfactory answer to the argument of the court. Chief Justice continues:
"The perfect equality of the different States lies at the foundation of the Union. As the institution of slavery in the States is one over which the Constitution of the United StatesUnited States gives no power to the General Government, it is left to be adopted or rejected by the several States, as they think best; nor can any one State, or number of States, claim the right to interfere with any other State upon the question of admitting or excluding this institution.
"A citizen of , who removes with his slave to , has no right to complain that the fundamental law of that State to which he removes, and in which he makes his residence, dissolves the relation between him and his slave. It is as much his own voluntary act, as if he had executed a deed of emancipation. No one can pretend ignorance of this Constitutional provision, and," he says, "the decisions which have heretofore been made in this State, and in many other slaveholding States, give effect to this and other similar provisions, on the ground that the master, by making the free State the residence of his slave, has submitted his right to the operation of the law of such State; and this," he says, "is the same in law as a regular deed of emancipation."
"I regard the question as conclusively settled by repeated adjudications of this court, and, if I doubted or denied the propriety of those decisions, I would not feel myself any more at liberty to overturn them, than I would any other series of decisions by which the law of any other question was settled. There is with me," he says, "nothing in the law relating to slavery which distinguishes it from the law on any other subject, or allows any more accommodation to the temporary public excitements which are gathered around it."
"In this State," he says, "it has been recognised from the beginning of the Government as a correct position in law, that a master who takes his slave to reside in a State or Territory where slavery is prohibited, thereby emancipates his slave." These decisions, which come down to the year 1837, seemed to have so fully settled the question, that since that time there has been no case bringing it before the court for any reconsideration, until the present. In the case of WinnyWinny versusv.WhitesidesWhitesides , the question was made in the argument, "whether one nation would execute the penal laws of another," and the court replied in this language, (, quoted in 4 Dallas,)which says, "personal rights or disabilities obtained or communicated by the laws of any particular place are of a nature which accompany the person wherever he goes;" and the Chief Justice observed, in the case of RachelRachel versusv.WalkerWalker , the act of CongressCongress called the MissouriMissouri compromise was held as operative as the ordinance of 1787.
When Dred ScottDred Scott , his wife and children, were removed from to , in 1838, they were free, as the law was then settled, and continued for fourteen years afterwards, up to 1852, when the above decision was made. Prior to this, for nearly thirty years, as Chief Justice GambleArchibald Gamble declares, the residence of a master with his slave in the , or in the , where slavery was prohibited by the act called the MissouriMissouri compromise, would manumit the slave as effectually as if he had executed a deed of emancipation; and that an officer of the army who takes his slave into that State or Territory, and holds him there as a slave, liberates him the same as any other citizenâand down to the above time it was settled by numerous and uniform decisions; and that on the return of the slave to , his former condition of slavery did not attach. Such was the settled law of until the decision of ScottScott and EmersonEmerson .
In the case of Sylvia versusv.Kirby , (17 Misso. Rep., 434,) the court followed the above decision, observing it was similar in all respects to the case of ScottScott and EmersonEmerson .
This court follows the established construction of the statutes of a State by its Supreme CourtSupreme Court . Such a construction is considered as a part of the statute, and we follow it to avoid two rules of property in the same State. But we do not follow the decisions of the Supreme CourtSupreme Court of a State beyond a statutory construction as a rule of decision for this court. State decisions are always viewed with respect and treated as authority; but we follow the settled construction of the statutes, not because it is of binding authority, but in pursuance of a rule of judicial policy.
But there is no pretence that the case of Dred ScottDred Scott versusv.EmersonEmerson turned upon the construction of a statute; nor was there any established rule of property which could have rightfully influenced the decision. On the contrary, the decision overruled the settled law for near thirty years.
This is said by my brethren to be a question; but there is nothing which gives it this character, except that it involves the right to persons claimed as slaves who reside in , and the decision was made by the Supreme CourtSupreme Court of that State. It involves a right claimed under an act of CongressCongress and the Constitution of , and which cannot be decided without the consideration and construction of those laws. But the Supreme Court of MissouriSupreme Court of Missouri held, in this case, that it will not regard either of those laws, without which there was no case before it; and Dred ScottDred Scott , having been a slave, remains a slave. In this respect it is admitted this is a questionâ a case which has but one side, if the act of CongressCongress and the Constitution of are not recognised.
And does such a case constitute a rule of decision for this court a case to be followed by this court? The course of decision so long and so uniformly maintained established a comity or law between and the free States and TerritoriesTerritories where slavery was prohibited, which must be somewhat regarded in this case. Rights sanctioned for twenty-eight years ought not and cannot be repudiated, with any semblance of justice, by one or two decisions, influenced, as declared, by a determination to counteract the excitement against slavery in the free States.
The courts of having held, for a series of years, that where a master took his slave to , or any free State, he was entitled to freedom, and that on bringing him back the status of slavery did not attach, the Legislature of declared by an act that the slave should not be made free under such circumstances. This regulated the rights of the master from the time the act took effect. But the decision of the court, reversing a former decision, affects all previous decisions, technically, made on the same principles, unless such decisions are protected by the lapse of time or the statute of limitations. Dred ScottDred Scott and his family, beyond all controversy, were free under the decisions made for twenty-eight years, before the case of ScottScott versusv.EmersonEmerson . This was the undoubted law of for fourteen years after ScottScott and his family were brought back to that State. And the grave question arises, whether this law may be so disregarded as to enslave free persons. I am strongly inclined to think that a rule of decision so well settled as not to be questioned, cannot be annulled by a single decision of the court. Such rights may be inoperative under the decision in future; but I cannot well perceive how it can have the same effect in prior cases.
It is admitted, that when a former decision is reversed, the technical effect of the judgment is to make all previous adjudications on the same question erroneous. But the case before us was not that the law had been erroneously construed, but that, under the circumstances which then existed, that law would not be recognised; and the reason for this is declared to be the excitement against the institution of slavery in the free States. While I lament this excitement as much as any one, I cannot assent that it shall be made a basis of judicial action.
In 1816, the common law, by statute, was made a part of the law of ;
and that includes the great principles of international law. These principles
cannot be abrogated by judicial decisions. It will require the same exercise of
power to abolish the common law, as to introduce it. International law is founded
in the opinions generally received and acted on by civilized nations, and enforced
by moral sanctions. It becomes a more authoritative system when it results from
special compacts, founded on modified rules, adapted to the exigencies of human
society; it is in fact an international morality, adapted to the best interests
of nations. And in regard to the States
of this Union, on the subject of slavery, it is eminently fitted for a rule of action,
subject to the Federal Constitution. "The laws of nations are but the natural rights of man
applied to nations." (
If the common law have the force of a statutory enactment in , it is clear, as it seems to me, that a slave who, by a residence in in the service of his master, becomes entitled to his freedom, cannot again be reduced to slavery by returning to his former domicil in a slave State. It is unnecessary to say what legislative power might do by a general act in such a case, but it would be singular if a freeman could be made a slave by the exercise of a judicial discretion. And it would be still more extraordinary if this could be done, not only in the absence of special legislation, but in a State where the common law is in force.
It is supposed by some, that
the third article in the treaty of cession of to this country, by , in 1803, may have some bearing on this question. The article referred to provides, "that the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated into the Union, and enjoy all the advantages of citizens of the , and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion they profess."
As slavery existed in at the time of the cession, it is supposed this is a guaranty that there should be no change in its condition.
The answer to this is, in the first place, that such a subject does not belong to the treaty-making power; and any such arrangement would have been nugatory. And, in the second place, by no admissible construction can the guaranty be carried further than the protection of property in slaves at that time in the ceded territory. And this has been complied with. The organization of the slave States of , , and , embraced every slave in at the time of the cession. This removes every ground of objection under the treaty. There is therefore no pretence, growing out of the treaty, that any part of the territory of , as ceded, beyond the organized States, is slave territory.
Under the fifth head, we were to consider whether the status of slavery attached to the plaintiff and wife, on their return to .
This doctrine is not asserted in the late opinion of the Supreme Court of MissouriSupreme Court of Missouri , and up to 1852 the contrary doctrine was uniformly maintained by that court.
In its late decision, the court say that it will not give effect in to the laws of , or the law of CongressCongress called the MissouriMissouri compromise. This was the effect of the decision, though its terms were, that the court would not take notice, judicially, of those laws.
In 1851, the Court of Appeals of South CarolinaCarolina recognised the principle, that a slave, being taken to a free State, became free. (Commonwealth versusv.Pleasants , 10 Leigh Rep., 697.) In Betty versusv.Horton , the Court of Appeals held that the freedom of the slave was acquired by the action of the laws of , by the said slave being taken there. (5 Leigh Rep., 615.)
The slave States have generally adopted the rule, that where the master, by a residence with his slave in a State or Territory where slavery is prohibited, the slave was entitled to his freedom everywhere. This was the settled doctrine of the Supreme Court of MissouriSupreme Court of Missouri . It has been so held in , in , in , formerly in , , and in other States.
The law, where a contract is made and is to be executed, governs it. This does not depend upon comity, but upon the law of the contract. And if, in the language of the Supreme Court of MissouriSupreme Court of Missouri , the master, by taking his slave to , and employing him there as a slave, emancipates him as effectually as by a deed of emancipation, is it possible that such an act is not matter for adjudication in any slave State where the master may take him? Does not the master assent to the law, when he places himself under it in a free State?
The States of and are bounded by a common line. The one prohibits slavery, the other admits it. This has been done by the exercise of that sovereign power which appertains to each. We are bound to respect the institutions of each, as emanating from the voluntary action of the people. Have the people of either any right to disturb the relations of the other? Each State rests upon the basis of its own sovereignty, protected by the Constitution. Our Union has been the foundation of our prosperity and national glory. Shall we not cherish and maintain it? This can only be done by respecting the legal rights of each State.
If a citizen of a free State shall entice or enable a slave to escape from the service of his master, the law holds him responsible, not only for the loss of the slave, but he is liable to be indicted and fined for the misdemeanor. And I am bound here to say, that I have never found a jury in the four States which constitute my circuit, which have not sustained this law, where the evidence required them to sustain it. And it is proper that I should also say, that more cases have arisen in my circuit, by reason of its extent and locality, than in all other parts of the Union. This has been done to vindicate the sovereign rights of the Southern States, and protect the legal interests of our brethren of the South.
Let these facts be contrasted with the case now before the court. has declared in the most solemn and impressive form that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in that State, and that any slave brought into it, with a view of becoming a resident, shall be emancipated. And effect has been given to this provision of the Constitution by the decision of the Supreme CourtSupreme Court of that State. With a full knowledge of these facts, a slave is brought from to , in the , and is retained there as a slave for two years, and then taken to , where slavery is prohibited by the MissouriMissouri compromise act, and there he is detained two years longer in a state of slavery. HarrietHarriet , his wife, was also kept at the same place four years as a slave, having been purchased in . They were then removed to the , and sold as slaves, and in the action before us they are not only claimed as slaves, but a majority of my brethren have held that on their being returned to the status of slavery attached to them.
I am not able to reconcile this result with the respect due to the . Having the same rights of sovereignty as the in adopting a Constitution, I can perceive no reason why the institutions of IllinoisIllinois should not receive the same consideration as those of . Allowing to my brethren the same right of judgment that I exercise myself, I must be permitted to say that it seems to me the principle laid down will enable the people of a slave State to introduce slavery into a free State, for a longer or shorter time, as may suit their convenience; and by returning the slave to the State whence he was brought, by force or otherwise, the status of slavery attaches, and protects the rights of the master, and defies the sovereignty of the free State. There is no evidence before us that Dred ScottDred Scott and his family returned to voluntarily. The contrary is inferable from the agreed case: "In the year 1838, Dr. EmersonEmerson removed the plaintiff and said. HarrietHarriet , and their daughter ElizaEliza , from to the State of , where they have ever since resided." This is the agreed case; and can it be inferred from this that ScottScott and family returned to voluntarily? He was removed; which shows that he was passive, as a slave, having exercised no volition on the subject. He did not resist the master by absconding or force. But that was not sufficient to bring him within Lord StowellStowell 's decision; he must have acted voluntarily. It would be a mockery of law and an outrage on his rights to coerce his return, and then claim that it was voluntary, and on that ground that his former status of slavery attached.
If the decision be placed on this ground, it is a fact for a jury to decide, whether the return was voluntary, or else the fact should be distinctly admitted. A presumption against the plaintiff in this respect, I say with confidence, is not authorized from the facts admitted.
In coming to the conclusion that a voluntary return by Grace to her former domicil, slavery attached, Lord StowellStowell took great pains to show that forced slavery upon her colonies, and that it was maintained by numerous acts of Parliament and public policy, and, in short, that the system of slavery was not only established by in her West Indian colonies, but that it was popular and profitable to many of the wealthy and influential people of , who were engaged in trade, or owned and cultivated plantations in the colonies. No one can read his elaborate views, and not be struck with the great difference between and her colonies, and the free and slave States of this Union. While slavery in the colonies of is subject to the power of the mother country, our States, especially in regard to slavery, are independent, resting upon their own sovereignties, and subject only to international laws, which apply to independent States.
In the case of WilliamsWilliams , who was a slave in , having run away, came to , Lord StowellStowell said: "The four judges all concur in thisâthat he was a slave in , though a free man in , and he would have continued a free man in all other parts of the world except ."
StraderStrader versusv.GrahamGraham (10 HowardHoward , 82, and 18 CurtisCurtis , 305) has been cited as having a direct bearing in the case before us. In that case the court say: "It was exclusively in the power of to determine, for itself, whether the employment of slaves in another State should or should not make them free on their return." No question was before the court in that case, except that of jurisdiction. And any opinion given on any other point is obiter dictum, and of no authority. In the conclusion of his opinion, the Chief Justice said: "In every view of the subject, therefore, this court has no jurisdiction of the case, and the writ of error must on that gronnd be dismissed."
In the case of Spencer versusv.Negro DennisDennis , (8 Gill's Rep., 321,) the court say: "Once free, and always free, is the maxim of law upon the subject. Freedom having once vested, by no compact between the master and the the liberated slave, nor by any condition subsequent, attached by the master to the gift of freedom, can a state of slavery be reproduced."
In HunterHunter versusv.Bulcher , (1 Leigh, 172:)
"By a statute of of 1796, all slaves brought into that State to reside are declared free; a Virginian-born slave is carried by his master to ; the master settled there, and keeps the slave there in bondage for twelve years, the statute in force all the time; then he brings him as a slave to , and sells him there. Adjudged, in an action brought by the man against the purchaser, that he is free."
Judge Kerr , in the case, says:
"Agreeing, as I do, with the general view taken in this case by my brother GreenGreen , I would not add a word, but to mark the exact extent to which I mean to go. The law of having enacted that slaves carried into that State for sale or to reside shall be free, and the owner of the slave here having carried him to , and voluntarily submitting himself and the slave to that law, it governs the case."
In every decision of a slave case prior to that of Dred ScottDred Scott versusv.EmersonEmerson , the Supreme Court of MissouriSupreme Court of Missouri considered it as turning upon the Constitution of , the ordinance of 1787, or the MissouriMissouri compromise act of 1820. The court treated these acts as in force, and held itself bound to execute them, by declaring the slave to be free who had acquired a domicil under them with the consent of his master.
The late decision reversed this whole line of adjudication, and held that neither the Constitution and laws of the States, nor acts of CongressCongress in relation to TerritoriesTerritories, could be judicially noticed by the Supreme Court of MissouriSupreme Court of Missouri . This is believed to be in conflict with the decisions of all the courts in the Southern States, with some exceptions of recent cases.
In Marie LouiseMarie Louise versusv.Morat et al. , (9 LouisianaLouisiana Rep., 475,) it was held, where a slave having been taken to the kingdom of or other country by the owner, where slavery is not tolerated, operates on the condition of the slave, and produces immediate emancipation; and that, where a slave thus becomes free, the master cannot reduce him again to slavery.
JosephineJosephine versusv.Poultney ,
LouisianaLouisiana Annual Rep., 329,) "where the owner removes with a slave into a State in which slavery is prohibited, with the intention of residing there, the slave will be thereby emancipated, and their subsequent return to the cannot restore the relation of master and slave." To the same import are the cases of SmithSmith versusv.SmithSmith , (13 LouisianaLouisiana Rep., 441; ThomasThomas versusv.Generis , LouisianaLouisiana Rep., 483; HarryHarry et al. versusv.DeckerDecker and Hopkins , Walker's Mississippi Rep., 36.) It was held that, "slaves within the jurisdiction of the became freemen by virtue of the ordinance of 1787, and can assert their claim to freedom in the courts of ." (Griffith versusv.Fanny , 1 VirginiaVirginia Rep., 143.) It was decided that a negro held in servitude in , under a deed executed in , is entitled to freedom by the Constitution of OhioOhio.
The case of Rhodes versusv.Bell (2 HowardHoward , 307; 15 CurtisCurtis , 152) involved the main principle in the case before us. A person residing in city purchased a slave in , and brought him to . continued under the law of , under the law of . The act of of November, 1796, (2 Maxcy's Laws, 351,) declared any one who shall bring any negro, mulatto, or other slave, into , such slave should be free. The above slave, by reason of his being brought into city, was declared by this court to be free. This, it appears to me, is a much stronger case against the slave than the facts in the case of ScottScott .
In Bush versusv.WhiteWhite , (3 Monroe, 104,) the court say:
"That the ordinance was paramount to the Territorial laws, and restrained the legislative power there as effectually as a Constitution in an organized State. It was a public act of the Legislature of the Union, and a part of the supreme law of the land; and, as such, this court is as much bound to take notice of it as it can be of any other law."
In the case of Rankin versusv.LydiaLydia , before cited, Judge Mills , speaking for the Court of Appeals of KentuckyKentucky, says:
"If, by the positive provision in our code, we can and must hold our slaves in the one case, and statutory provisions equally positive decide against that right in the other, and liberate the slave, he must, by an authority equally imperious, be declared free. Every argument which supports the right of the master on one side, based upon the force of written law, must be equally conclusive in favor of the slave, when he can point out in the statute the clause which secures his freedom."
And he further said:
"Free people of color in all the States are, it is believed, quasi citizens, or, at least, denizens. Although none of the States may allow them the privilege of office and suffrage, yet all other civil and conventional rights are secured to them; at least, such rights were evidently secured to them by the ordinance in question for the government of IndianaIndiana. If these rights are vested in that or any other portion of the , can it be compatible with the spirit of our confederated Government to deny their existence in any other part? Is there less comity existing between State and State, or State and Territory, than exists between the despotic Governments of ?"
These are the words of a learned and great judge, born and educated in a slave State.
I now come to inquire, under the sixth and last head, "whether the decisions of the Supreme Court of MissouriSupreme Court of Missouri , on the question before us, are binding on this court."
While we respect the learning and high intelligence of the State courts, and consider their decisions, with others, as authority, we follow them only where they give a construction to the State statutes. On this head, I consider myself fortunate in being able to turn to the decision of this court, given by Mr. Justice Grier , in Pease versusv.Peck , a case from the , (18 HowardHoward , 589,) decided in December term, 1855. Speaking for the court, Judge Grier said:
"We entertain the highest respect for that learned court, (the Supreme Court of Michigan,) and in any question affecting the construction of their own laws, where we entertain any doubt, would be glad to be relieved from doubt and responsibility by reposing on their decision. There are, it is true, many dicta to be found in our decisions, averring that the courts of the are bound to follow the decisions of the State courts on the construction of their own laws. But although this may be correct, yet a rather strong expression of a general rule, it cannot be received as the annunciation of a maxim of universal application. Accordingly, our reports furnish many cases of exceptions to it. In all cases where there is a settled construction of the laws of a State, by its highest judicature established by admitted precedent, it is the practice of the courts of the to receive and adopt it, without criticism or further inquiry. When the decisions of the State court are not consistent, we do not feel bound to follow the last, if it is contrary to our own convictions; and much more is this the case where, after a long course of consistent decisions, some new light suddenly springs up, or an excited public opinion has elicited new doctrines subversive of former safe precedent."
These words, it appears to me, have a stronger application to the case before us than they had to the cause in which they were spoken as the opinion of this court; and I regret that they do not seem to be as fresh in the recollection of some of my brethren as in my own. For twenty-eight years, the decisions of the Supreme Court of MissouriSupreme Court of Missouri were consistent on all the points made in this case. But this consistent course was suddenly terminated, whether by some new light suddenly springing up, or an excited public opinion, or both, it is not necessary to say. In the case of ScottScott versusv.EmersonEmerson , in 1852, they were overturned and repudiated.
This, then, is the very case in which seven of my brethren declared they would not follow the last decision. On this authority I may well repose. I can desire no other or better basis.
But there is another ground which I deem conclusive, and which I will re-state.
The Supreme Court of MissouriSupreme Court of Missouri refused to notice the act of CongressCongress or the Constitution of IllinoisIllinois, under which Dred ScottDred Scott , his wife and children, claimed that they are entitled to freedom.
This being rejected by the court, there was no case before it, or least it was a case with only one side. And this is the case which, in the opinion of this court, we are bound to follow. The court disregards the express provisions of an act of CongressCongress and the Constitution of a sovereign State, both of which laws for twenty-eight years it had not only regarded, but carried into effect.
If a State court may do this, on a question involving the liberty of a
human being, what protection do the laws afford? So far from this being a
question, it is a question, as it would seem, within
the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act, where a right to freedom being set up under the act of CongressCongress , and the decision being against such right, it may be brought for revision before this court, from the Supreme Court of MissouriSupreme Court of Missouri .
I think the judgment of the court below should be reversed.