So there were two strategies going on. Tell me about the potential for conflict.
It was our, it was our understanding that the strategy of the Chicago freedom movement and Martin Luther King was to come out of Chicago with a victory, ah, with a change in racial segregation, in racial discrimination. Ah, that they saw that being accomplished by some sort of a confrontation with City Hall. Ah, on our part, ah, that, that denied I think the basic institutional framework of the city. Ah, the mayor wasn't the only person responsible for what went on in the city. The religious institutions were responsible, business, labor, ah, civic groups of one kind. And therefore, if there was to be any kind of a confrontation it had to be in the context of the total community responding, ah, to Martin Luther King and the freedom movement. And that fit their objectives because I think ultimately when the summit agreement, ah, was reached, all of those parties were at the bargaining table. And the mayor wanted it. Martin Luther King wanted it and so did the Chicago freedom movement, so that there were commonalities. The question was how do you engineer whatever was going to be the resolution of his stay in Chicago in a way that didn't, ah, ah, make the city blow up. And, ah, I know in many of the conversations we had, ah, the, we discussed specific things on which, well, if somebody wanted this and somebody wanted something else we discussed whether or not that was a good thing to give on.
Can you tell me the campaign--