Production Team: C
Interview Date: October 24, 1988
Camera Rolls: 2033-2037
Sound Rolls: 216-218
Interview with , conducted by Blackside, Inc. on October 24, 1988, for . Washington University Libraries, Film and Media Archive, Henry Hampton Collection. These transcripts contain material that did not appear in the final program. Only text appearing in bold italics was used in the final version of
QUESTION 1SHEILA C. BERNARD: Was Mayor Daley supportive of the National Civil Rights Movement?
ED MARCINIAK: The, ah, the mayor supported legislative issues in Springfield and in Washington which advanced the objectives of the Civil Rights Movement, whether it was employment or in any other area. He was a s- strong supporter of a state fair employment practices law, early supporter of a state fair housing law, and finally, under his administration, in 1963, the Ch- Chicago passed a fair housing ordinance.
QUESTION 2SHEILA C. BERNARD: Can you tell me about, there was an existing Civil Rights Movement in Chicago: was Daley Responsive to the Black population in Chicago?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, the Civil Rights Movement was an interracial movement. The mayor was responsive to the nine or ten or eleven Black--I think there were nine Black aldermen at the time. There were states, there were state representatives, state senators, state congressmen and he saw himself as a political leader responding to the political leadership which the Black community in Chicago had elected. In other words, he saw, he saw that Civil Rights Movement as an auxiliary to the basic system for achieving political objective.
QUESTION 3SHEILA C. BERNARD: Was there a conflict in the ministry between working within the system and working without the system? Was he more respectful of one than the other?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, the mayor was not only the mayor of Chicago. He was the head of the Democratic Party. Ah, he was a political animal. Very political. And therefore, he was sensitive to the, the concerns and the demands of the ward committeemen and the political leadership which surrounded him and which made him the, the chief of the Cook County Democratic party. Ah, he, he, ah, he, ah, I think he had a difficult time understanding, ah, the political role of people who didn't run for political office. And who made demands but were not willing to test, ah, the, the proposals and the ideas before the people. If, and so he had a natural respect for anybody, even if the person lost or opposed him if the person ran for office. But if, if he or she did run for office, ah, his attitude was, ah, why do I have to pay attention that much? I'd rather pay attention to the people who are active in the political system.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: Stop.
QUESTION 4SHEILA C. BERNARD: How did you feel when you learned that SCLC had chosen Chicago is the first city in it's northern campaign.
ED MARCINIAK: Well, we had, we knew for several months that negotiations were going on with the Southern Christian Leadership Cons- ah, Conference about, ah, Martin Luther King and his, ah, friends coming to Chicago. Ah, we were, we knew also n- that they were discussing the issues, and the question of money, the question of support for, ah, and it was not until, and it, and Martin Luther King had come here several times unofficially to Chicago for meetings and so on. And so the question was when would the official arrival take place? Ah, and I think what we were basically doing is trying to prepare for his appearance, ah, and the activities that would be associated with it as well as we could. Ah, It was clear I think to us at the time that what the Chicago freedom movement wanted was a way to get a confrontation with City Hall. Ah, and our purpose was to see if we could avoid a confrontation, to diffuse any issue that might percipitate a confrontation. This, we were not Birmingham, we were not Selma, we were Chicago. Interview gathered as part of Eyes on the Prize II: America at the Racial Crossroads 1965-1985; Episode 202-09 And in Chicago, you don't do it the way they do it in those southern cities in 19- in the 1960s. And consequently, what we tried to do was to figure out some way of giving Martin Luther King a, a, a victory. So our planning was what could he come to Chicago for and come out with? That was our basic strategy, to see if we could figure it out.
QUESTION 5SHEILA C. BERNARD: Did you feel singled out in any way with Chicago worse than any other northern city, did it seem fair that they chose Chicago?
ED MARCINIAK: I think the mayor felt, ah, ah, put out about the choice of Chicago compared to other cities. Ah, and I re- I re- I recall that in the first meetings between Martin Luther King and the mayor, a one-on-one meeting. And, and there were two of us sitting in the back. I, one of Martin Luther King's aids and I was sitting in the back in the first meeting in which the mayor and Martin Luther King had their first opportunity to ch- chat. And they talked about the fan- their families. Ah, they talked about, ah, what, ah, what, what, ah, they'd also talked about the question that we just discussed which was, ah, ah, Mar- why was Martin Luther picking Chicago? Ah, why, why, there were other cities in the South which were much worse. Why did he have to come North? I don't think the mayor said anything invidious about other northern cities. But I think he was willing to say there are many cities down there where situations are far worse than they are in Chicago.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: Can you stop?
QUESTION 6SHEILA C. BERNARD: Can you tell me about meeting Dr. King at the airport and about the fears you and Mayor Daley had that he would stumble in a different, in the North?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, when the official arrival date of Martin Luther King was announced, ah, I went to see the mayor and I said, "I think I ought to go and greet him at the airport." And he said, "Fine." So the police drove me out there. The, ah, airport terminal itself was full of Martin Luther King's supporters so they took me up from the outside. And I got on the plane, ah, before anybody had seen King. And as he was walking down the isle I came up to, ah, Dr. King and I said I c- "I'm here to, ah, give you welcome on behalf of the mayor and I hope that we can work together in achieving the objectives that you're, you're seeking." I then quietly left so that they could have their public display in the terminal so I wouldn't gum up, ah, what they were doing in the terminal. And I think Al Raby appreciated that, that I let it, let them, let him come right out of, ah, the gate into the terminal. And I quietly gone down the steps and with the police and driven away. Ah, that was part of the, that a- That welcome was both genuine and part of a strategy. The strategy was, here was a man coming to a city he didn't know, to a city whose political institutions, with which he was not familiar. Ah, he was dealing with people basically who were non-political, ah suspicous of the political establishment, and so the adivce and counsel that he would be getting would be by and large, ah advice that didn't come through the normal political channels Interview gathered as part of Eyes on the Prize II: America at the Racial Crossroads 1965-1985; Episode 202-03 And it was possible that he could stumble. He could make a mistake--a grievous one--that would, ah, rip the city apart in such a way, ah, that wounds would be hard to heal. And, ah, ah, the emi- I know what the im- ah, well, leave it at that.
QUESTION 7SHEILA C. BERNARD: OK, um, can you, Can you briefly describe your conflicting strategies? The freedom movement were going for confrontation; the mayor was going to avoid one at any cost. What were the conflicting strategies?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, I don't know whether, whether it would be at any cost because that may be too high a price. Ah, you know.
QUESTION 8SHEILA C. BERNARD: So there were two strategies going on. Tell me about the potential for conflict.
ED MARCINIAK: It was our, it was our understanding that the strategy of the Chicago freedom movement and Martin Luther King was to come out of Chicago with a victory, ah, with a change in racial segregation, in racial discrimination. Ah, that they saw that being accomplished by some sort of a confrontation with City Hall. Ah, on our part, ah, that, that denied I think the basic institutional framework of the city. Ah, the mayor wasn't the only person responsible for what went on in the city. The religious institutions were responsible, business, labor, ah, civic groups of one kind. And therefore, if there was to be any kind of a confrontation it had to be in the context of the total community responding, ah, to Martin Luther King and the freedom movement. And that fit their objectives because I think ultimately when the summit agreement, ah, was reached, all of those parties were at the bargaining table. And the mayor wanted it. Martin Luther King wanted it and so did the Chicago freedom movement, so that there were commonalities. The question was how do you engineer whatever was going to be the resolution of his stay in Chicago in a way that didn't, ah, ah, make the city blow up. And, ah, I know in many of the conversations we had, ah, the, we discussed specific things on which, well, if somebody wanted this and somebody wanted something else we discussed whether or not that was a good thing to give on.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: Can you tell me the campaign--
SHEILA C. BERNARD: --ok stop.
QUESTION 9SHEILA C. BERNARD: The Chicago Freedom Movement announced housing as it's focus, and sometime around February, Mayor Daley announced his own program to end slums--the movement people charged that this was just a ploy to undermine what they were doing. Was he sincere?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, the, the fre- The Chicago freedom movement ultimately chose housing as an issue. Ah, the, the bad housing conditions, ah, ah, were there. There was no doubt about it. The, the housing was deteriorated. The housing was substandard. Ah. I think the mayor's point was I, you can't hold me responsible for the slums of Chicago. Ah, ah, and there's a, there is a real estate market. There are private landlords. There are private owners. Ah, I'm trying to do my best, ah, to end these slums and I'm willing to work with anybody who wants to do something about, ah, improving, ah, housing. Ah, I don't think the mayor was generally, ah, how shall I put it, It was genera- the mayor generally wasn't at home with the expression "slums". And the reason why he wasn't was that he saw very many people who grew up, had a great life, moved out of the area that, th- they had lived in their neighborhood and then later they were told they had lived in a slum. And so he didn't want to create in people an image of themselves as being slum dwellers. And so he had a very difficult time with the word slum and using it. And consequently, I think he would have used another word because he didn't want to fix an image on a family or a person. He wanted that person to feel that he or she could rise out from whatever, ah, status they had been in, whether unemployed or poor, whether, ah, they were new, new migrants of the city or immigrants, whoever--that they could get out of it. But he didn't want them stamped with that slum image. Or, or them to feel that they were in a slum and therefore they couldn't do anything.
QUESTION 10SHEILA C. BERNARD: Well there was seriously substandard housing and it was Black people that lived in it, and there wasn't a whole lot happening to change that or was there?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, there, there were Black people living in the s- in the slums. There were White people, fewer numbers, living in the slums. They weren't all, they weren't all Blacks by an- by any stretch of the imagination. Ah, the area on the near side where there was some Italian communities, ah, was called little liddi- little, little Italy, ah, and twenty-five years later the Italians discovered they were living in a slum. So the, the, those weren't the only areas. Ah, I think, ah, ah, the mayor participated very, ah, enthusiastically in every federal program which had been initiated to improve housing in the city. Ah, I, ah, I visited some of these slum buildings. Ah, I visited a building, for example, that was going to be torn down to make room for a public housing project and there were kids swarming on the back porches, ah, running up and down. It was a spring day. And I started walking up the steps and my guide said, "Don't go up those steps." And I said "Why?" "They're unsafe." But yet these kids were running up and down. Well, those buildings went down. So there was a, a considerable amount of slum clearance and the building of new buildings like public housing projects, ah, the large scale, ah, ah, lo- middle income developments along the lakefront. They were put up by, ah, men like Fred Cramerp--
QUESTION 11SHEILA C. BERNARD: What I'm going to ask you about, there was the rally at Soldiers' Field, followed by the march, I wanted you to tell me the story about being at City Hall watching the marchers, so could you could you describe the march to City Hall?
ED MARCINIAK: Oh, I was at the rally and I had a police car take me back to, to City Hall and um, it was just about dusk. And the, ah, men and women who were in the march were walking s- 10, 12, 15 abreast. They had taken up the sidewalks and street. Ah, and they were walking down LaSalle Street which is already a corridor kind of street. And it was, it was a, ah, impressive disconcerting sight to see these people because they were not mar- marching in regular, ah, fashion. They were just marching free-flowing down the street. Ah, when, ah, when they posted their, ah, demands on the doors of City Hall I was inside City Hall looking out and watching Martin Luther King and Al Raby, ah, putting those, ah, demands on the door. And then the flow of the march went by.
QUESTION 12SHEILA C. BERNARD: You've been critical of those demands, can you explain why?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, to be honest with you, first of all, I don't remember all of the, ah, I don't think they were very clear. Ah, the one clear impression I had about the demands that they were making is they were fairly general, ah, and there were one or two specific ones like a police-civilian review board. Ah, but other, other than that they were fairly general as I recall it. I mean, they, they were not, ah, maybe you could refresh my memory on it but I don't recall them being that specific.
QUESTION 13SHEILA C. BERNARD: Can you describe the meeting with Mayor Daley the next day? What you told me before was that the mayor was looking for something he could respond to and say yes to--
ED MARCINIAK: Yeah. In the, in the meeting that was held the next day with the mayor and the leadership of the, ah, freedom movement and Martin Luther King, ah, each of these demands were discussed. And it was very interesting. The freedom movement wanted to get a no out of the mayor on each of demands and he refused. And ev- every time they tried to get a no out of him he'd say, "Well we could look at it from this perspective and maybe we could do something over here." Ah, the one place where he almost said no was on the, ah, ah, demand for a police civilian, ah, police review board. And the mayor's answer was, "Well, I'm against it because my superintendent of police is against it. But I'd be happy to talk to him about it again." Ah, and, but that was the tenor of the conversation and I, I think they were, ah, they were expecting something different. When they came out and met with the press, ah, they said that, the freedom movement said that they didn't get anything. Well, it's true. They didn't get anything because this was not the meeting, ah, in which, ah, specific things, ah, were talked about. But s- specific things could have been talked about, but they weren't.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: I'm just not understanding this. The mayor said yes to--
ED MARCINIAK: No. He never said no to any of them. He had, he had a c--
SHEILA C. BERNARD: Can you also start with Mayor Daley
ED MARCINIAK: Yeah. Mayor, Mayor Daley in this meeting, ah, with the leadership of the freedom movement and Martin Luther King said no to none of their demands. Ah, what he did was to try to see whether it was possible, ah, to, ah, meet the demands in some way. Half way, minor, in a minor way, but to meet it. A- and, ah, they just couldn't take it because they were looking for nos. And I, I remember repeatedly somebody would say you mean you're saying no. And mayor's saying, "No, I'm not. I'm, why don't we try it this way?" Or whatever, whatever was the possibi- ah, whatever might have been the possibility he was trying to, ah, draw it out at them and come to some, ah, meeting on it.
QUESTION 14SHEILA C. BERNARD: Was it at that meeting that they threatened to start direct action in the neighborhood?
ED MARCINIAK: No. That was not the meeting. No, that was sub- subsequently.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: The next day--
ED MARCINIAK: Housing was not the major issue at this meeting. Just keep that in mind. It was one of seventeen or whatever the number of demands was. It was one of, one of the demands and it, the demands had to do with schools, do with police. It had to do with, ah, public services. A whole host of issues. And that's why, ah, they were fairly gen- general.
QUESTION 15SHEILA C. BERNARD: The next day rioting breaks out in the street, and Mayor Daley blamed it on the movement. Can you talk about why or what would lead them to connect the two of them? The rally and the rioting?
ED MARCINIAK: I don't know the forum in which the mayor, or the way in which the mayor ble- ah, blamed the freedom movement, but I think--
SHEILA C. BERNARD: Cut, it's a siren.
ED MARCINIAK: What most people don't realize--
ED MARCINIAK: What most people don't realize was the impression that that march created over the television stations. It looked disorderly. It looked disorganized. It looked like people were taking over the streets of Chicago. That was the impression. My feeling was that that image was disconcerting to me because I don't know how people out in the communities would take it, whether the youngsters wouldn't see in it a license to repeat what they thought they saw over those, ah, television channels. Ah. The mayor didn't see this except on television. I saw it first hand and I saw it later on the ten o'clock news. Ah, and to the, uh--Secondly, The mayor did feel that there was no need for outsiders, ah, to stir up the troops in Chicago. And therefore I think his natural inclination was to say, "Well we have never had these things before. Now they're happening. What's the explanation?" It must be these events and these people and the way they're doing things, ah, that was responsible, that, them, was responsible for the rioting that took place Eyes on the Prize II: America at the Racial Crossroads 1965 - 1985; Episode 202-11.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: Cut.
QUESTION 16SHEILA C. BERNARD: Can you tell me, sort of start spend a couple months looking for a confrontation and they finally get it in the Marquette Park? Can you describe watching that process take place and realizing that this would be the confrontation?
ED MARCINIAK: What we found it difficult to do was to k- arrive at some sort of an understanding or an agreement. Our objective was to find some way to give the freedom movement, Ma Luthin King[SIC] a victory that he could take home. Ah, we w- weren't able to find it. Ah, they couldn't find a dramatic elements for, or create the dramatic elements for th- this kind of confrontation. Ah, when, when they announced, ah, the marches we had a clear si- c- city policy at the time which was that, ah, ah, any- if a Black family moved in an all-White neighborhood, if it took a thousand police to protect that White family's rights to move in that neighborhood we'd have a thousand police on them.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: Try that again--
ED MARCINIAK: The city, well, if, it, the city's policy with regard to fair housing was that if a Black family moved in to an all-White neighborhood, it was the police's job to protect that family's right to move into that home. And if it took a thousand police to do it we, we had a thousand police out there. And superintendent Orlando Wilson at the time understood that policy, ah, and then carried it out. And it was our staff who did the community relations work whenever that occurred. There, there were only one or two cases where we had to have that many police out. Maybe a couple of hundred. And if you talk about two or three day shifts, it was a thousand police. But that was an important part of the fair housing policy. It was one thing to say you can't discriminate against a person because of his or her race in the purchase or sale of a home. It's another thing to protect your right if you do move in.
QUESTION 17SHEILA C. BERNARD: Why do you think they were choosing to march in the White neighborhoods?
ED MARCINIAK: Because they got a negative reaction. And the television cameras were there to catch the hate and the objections of the people who stood along the streets as Martin Luther King and his people marched by. But this raised the other question that you and I have discussed which has to do with the other side of the fair housing policy. Ah. The city's, ah, policy was twofold. We, we needed a fair housing policy which would guarantee anybody's right to rent or buy, but on the other hand, we wanted to prevent the resegregation of neighborhoods. We wanted racial integration to work. We, we didn't want to move from all-White to all-Black neighborhoods. And what that, um, set of marches did was raise the specter of that policy failing because we had block to block change racially and that was the, one of the two objectives of the city policy, was to try to prevent that.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: OK, cut please.
QUESTION 18SHEILA C. BERNARD: I'm not sure that I followed the last argument. The argument is that the movement it--what they were doing is successful, that would have gone against what the--the cities policy was to integrate the neighborhoods.
ED MARCINIAK: No, no. The, the marches to the dismay of the residents symbolized total racial change for the neighborhoods in which the freedom movement was marching. It wasn't a question at that point of fair housing. It was a question of would the neighborhood go all Black. And were these marches going to contribute to racial succi- succession, racial change or racial resegregation.
QUESTION 19SHEILA C. BERNARD: And were they?
ED MARCINIAK: Pardon me?
SHEILA C. BERNARD: Were they?
ED MARCINIAK: Were the marches going to do that? If they lasted long enough they might because they might scare the daylights out of, ah, the, out of people who just didn't want to get in- involved in violence, and were may, may or may not be racially prejudiced or bigoted. I mean, you know, it would have affected a lot of other people besides the people who were on the streets. There were a lot of people who were not on the streets and who didn't like what was going on.
QUESTION 20SHEILA C. BERNARD: Why did you think the neighborhood residents were afraid of the marches?
ED MARCINIAK: What did the marches mean to neighborhood residents? They were worried that the marches were the first step towards turning neighborhoods from--their neighborhood--from all White to all Black. And that the marches were saying to them that what had been taking place for the last twenty years in the neighborhoods to the east of them, ah, one block at a time, the neighborhood went Black, that that was going to happen here. And that's what, that's what these marchers wanted. And it wasn't just a fair housing policy. It was to take over the neighborhood and to change it racially.
QUESTION 21SHEILA C. BERNARD: What did the marches mean to Mayor Daley and how did he respond to that?
ED MARCINIAK: What, what the marches meant to Mayor Daley was, ah, that there was a potential for violence, a potential for very serious violence, a potential for political ruptures, ah, between the, ah, White leaders in the east communities and the Black leadership who were leaders in the city council who were spon- espousing a fair housing policy, and which many of the White aldermen had voted for. And it was being ruptured by the failure, apparent failure of a policy to prevent total racial change. And so the, ah, to the mayor, as, as the marches escalated, and as they moved to other wards of the city, ah, it meant, ah, the loss of control, ah, the loss of political ability to, ah, keep the situation i- under control, peaceful. And that there was a dang- a danger of major law disorder. And that wa- that was the perspective of the mayor.
QUESTION 22SHEILA C. BERNARD: What was the risk to the mayor in terms of police protection? What was it doing to the police force?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, he, he had a superintendent who believed in the policies that we're talking about. And therefore, his job was to pick people would carry out such orders, whether it was on the marches or in the case of a family that moved, Black family that moved in a White neighborhood. We didn't have a wishy-washy police superintendent. That was extremely important on this question.
QUESTION 23SHEILA C. BERNARD: But was this stretch- was the protection of marches stretching the police force?
ED MARCINIAK: Sure it would. Because it meant you had to take police away from other sections of the city to protect the marchers and to prevent, ah, major violence, ah, when they marched in the neighborhood. And so there were hundreds of police being taken away from neighborhoods to concentrate on this particular issue.
QUESTION 24SHEILA C. BERNARD: What led Mayor Daley to the bargaining table?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, first of all, you have to remember that the mayor was a political master. His objective was to win friends and influence enemies. It was not to make enemies. And so he was looking for the opportunity to come to the bargaining table. He didn't have to be made to come to the bargaining table. That's what he wanted. And if, if the, these, these marches brought everybody to the ma- ah, bargaining table, the business community, the religious leaders, the, ah, leaders of the labor movement, civic leaders, that's exactly what he wanted. And we got it.
QUESTION 25SHEILA C. BERNARD: How did you feel about what was finally agreed on?
ED MARCINIAK: The major accomplishment of Martin Luther King's presence in Chicago was the creation of the Leadership Council for metropolitan communities. For this--for the mayor it was a victory. The mayor had failed for six or seven years to make fair housing a metropolitan question. It was a metropolitan real estate market. He was afraid that, ah, the, ah, law would simply keep segregation growing in Chicago with a ring of White suburbs. That's why the mayor went originally to Springfield to get a fair housing law which would cover the city and the suburbs. Ah, when the leadership council for metropolitan open communities was formed, ah, we had, we had, we had accomplished a major objective. As a matter of fact, it was the mayor who called the president of Illinois Bell to become the head of the leadership council for, ah, the leadership council for metropolitan open communities. It was the mayor who called Ben Hyman when he was fishing in Wisconsin to chair the summit conference here in Chicago. So the mayor, mayor was actively interested in putting this together.
QUESTION 26SHEILA C. BERNARD: How do you respond to people that say it was a sell-out and we should have kept marching?
ED MARCINIAK: Depends upon what your objective is. Your, if your objective is civil disorder, ah, I think that was a worthy objective. If your objective is to find solutions to tortuous human problems like racial discrimination and segregation, ah, I think that, that attitude is, ah, ah, hazardous, disastrous.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: I just need to ask you again to talk, to continue, marching? What would they have gotten by continuing marching?
ED MARCINIAK: The, if the marchers had continued they would not have gotten the kind of summit conference which resulted in, in a victory for Martin Luther King and for the mayor. What they would ultimately have gotten was a major civil disorder in this city. Or if not, a major political disruption or, or who knows? We could have had riots.
QUESTION 27SHEILA C. BERNARD: The mayor got an injunction against the marches after the bargaining had started. That seems like kind of a dirty pull. Why did he need this injunction?
ED MARCINIAK: The injunction had been prepared before the meeting. The mayor was a man who d- s- it's the right thing to do. Let's do it. It was also a bargaining chip. It meant that he had some more strength at the bargaining table. Ah, remember that the people who really called the summit agreement were the religious leaders in the Chicago conference on religion and race. And so there were three parties really at the table. Ah, the leadership of the city, the religious leaders in the, and the freedom movement. Ah, or the leadership represented by the, by the, ah, freedom movement. Ah, in that, ah, Well. I, I lost the point beyond that.
QUESTION 28SHEILA C. BERNARD: Why was it ok to issue an injunction which limited the power that the marchers had?
ED MARCINIAK: Well if you believe that ultimately the marches might lead to civil disorder, an injunction was one way to go.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: Cut please. Sorry.
QUESTION 29SHEILA C. BERNARD: What finally brought them to the bargaining table?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, the mayor wanted to come to the bargaining table right along. He didn't have to be brought there. What he was looking for is a reason to come to the bargaining table to see if these could be nego- issues could be negotiated out rather than settled out in the streets of Chicago. And when the religious leaders started taking the initiative to set up the summit conference the mayor jumped at it. As a matter of fact, he was the person that brought many of the key principles into that meeting personally. I don't know whether you want the Heineman incident--
QUESTION 30SHEILA C. BERNARD: No that's fine. Going back to the war on poverty and the fact that Mayor Daley took the war on poverty and made it part of his own machine. Can you tell me about how Mayor Daley, what his response to the war on poverty programs was?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, the war on poverty in Chicago, ah, was a war that w- had the approval of the office of economic opportunity. So the strategy here in Chicago to carry on the war against poverty was probably no different than it was in forty or fifty other cities. It, it is true that the, since it was government money that was coming in, the mayor wanted to make sure that the money was used in accordance with city policy and was not used to, ah, fight City Hall. And therefore he created a Chicago Committee on Urban Opportunity. That, that was its name. And the, the guy that headed it was Deacon J. Brooks, ah, a former editor of the Daily Defender, Chicago Daily Defender. And he had headed up that, that program.
QUESTION 31SHEILA C. BERNARD: How do you respond to accusations that Daley put all of his own people that would be his people in charge of the program?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, the program was by and large carried out to some of the ex- existing or mostly through existing institutions, political or non-political. So it was carried out through--I mean, it wasn't a question of putting people in so much as it was who would be used to wage the war against poverty. So it would be the s- s- school system. It would be department of human, ah, services. It would be the police department. Whatever. Or the private agencies, churches, and other social welfare agencies that were involved in the program. Ah, what the, the opposition to this approach wanted was they wanted the money. And the mayor wanted the money and the mayor won.
QUESTION 32SHEILA C. BERNARD: Can I ask you again about the implication that the Black people who supported Mayor Daley were just completely under his thumb? How would you, your response when we talked was that, some people work within a system some people, choose not to do it in a democratic way. Can you--
ED MARCINIAK: The aldermen who supported the mayor and who represented predominantly Black wards were elected by large majorities. Therefore, who is to say that they didn't represent their wards? I mean, they got tens and tens of thousands of votes to be elected alderman or ward committeemen or state representatives. Therefore, how can anybody say that they're not representative? Unless you don't believe in the democratic voting process and you want to get around it some way to get your pers- point of view across.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: We ran out.
ED MARCINIAK: We ran out?
QUESTION 33SHEILA C. BERNARD: Why would Black residents support Mayor Daley?
ED MARCINIAK: Well they would, ah, first support Mayor Daley--
SHEILA C. BERNARD: I'm sorry you need to talk about Black citizens, Black voters. Actually, why would Black voters support Mayor Daley?
ED MARCINIAK: Ah, Black voters, like White voters, usually rely on their neighbors, their precinct captain, their alderman, their ward committeeman, their state representative. And so if the alliances and the allegiances and the loyalties are close, then they will support the candidates, citywide, which their local poli-litical[SIC] leadership supports. And therefore, most voters opt to work inside the political system, not outside it or around the political system. So if you opt to work within the political system as a public official or as an elected official, there is a way to go about it. Ah, if you opt outside the system there's another way to go about it. And those may work together or they may not work together, or they may conflict. I think the, the, the error that occur-curred[SIC] here was to assume that the political establishment was monolithic o- on whee- unyielding. But it was just the opposite. It wanted to yield. It wanted to bend. It wanted to accommodate on the one hand and accommodate on the other hand. That's working within the political system. And the people who were outside the political, ah, system just don't understand that kind of behavior.
QUESTION 34SHEILA C. BERNARD: Let me go back to the marches through the White neighborhood. Given the fear about loosing property value, there was an extraordinary amount of hate and disgusting signs, horrible slogans, and rock throwing and bottle throwing. Was that hate typical of Chicago? Where did that come from? The White anger?
ED MARCINIAK: To look at the television portrayal of the marchers was to see only part of the reality. Where were all the other people in those neighborhoods? Ten, twenty times those who stood on the streets. They weren't part of it. And it was a mistake I think, ah, to smear everybody who lived in the neighborhood for the actions of those protectors, those vilifiers, ah, those people who manifested hatred on the sidewalks of these neighborhoods. The, the, the television stations really never could figure out whether that was a representative group of people who were on the sidewalks, ah, ah, throwing stones and rocks at the marchers.
QUESTION 35SHEILA C. BERNARD: So who was on the sidewalks? Who were?
ED MARCINIAK: They, they were the activists who reflected, ah, some of the worst things about Chicago. Ah. Ah, they also saw the marchers as the activists who were going to turn their neighborhoods from all-White to all-Black. And so they felt offensive about it. Now whether they were representative, I don't know. Nobody knows whether they were representative. And therefore to smear all Whites on the southwest side or the northwest side I think is a fundamental error.
QUESTION 36SHEILA C. BERNARD: Going to that theory about turning a neighborhood from all-White to all-Black. Can you talk about the other interests that actually do contribute to turning a neighborhood, beyond real estate, business interests--
ED MARCINIAK: Ah, the major engineers of racial segregation in the sixties were, ah, the, the real estate industry and the mortgage finance industry. The mortgage fina- finance industry simply boycotted those areas which were Black, and they also, ah, refused to make loans to Blacks who moved into predominantly White blocks. And they even refused to rent, ah, make mort- mortgages to Whites who bought in a block in which a Black had already moved in. That was one aspect. But the major architects who were, ah, were the real estate brokers because we had two real estate markets--one for Blacks and one for Whites. What we were, were trying to achieve in city government was a single real estate market, one which catered to anybody who was shopping for housing and could afford to buy or rent. But with the dual housing market that we had the question always was: is this building in the Black market or is it in the White market? And, and the brokers all behaved that way. So did the Black brokers. The Black brokers, as well as the White brokers, helped engineer the transfer of a house from the White ma- housing market to the Black housing market. And that is the way in which the blocks went one by one from Black to White.
QUESTION 37SHEILA C. BERNARD: So was it naive of the Chicago freedom movement to target open housing as a simple issue that they could--you had the right to be served?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, it, no. It's not naive to talk about open housing as a clear cut moral issue.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: I'm sorry--I was talking, could you start again?
ED MARCINIAK: Oh. It, the, it was, it is na-aive[SIC]--It was not naive for the freedom movement to talk about open housing, fair housing as a moral issue, as a civil rights issue. That's clear. The question is how do you change generations of racial segregation and discrimination in housing? What are the best methods for doing it? And that's where the disagreement comes about. Are you right or am I right? And the approach that we're going to take to do it. Am I going too slow? You want me to go faster than I'm capable of doing. That's where the arguments are about. They were not about the principle.
QUESTION 38SHEILA C. BERNARD: And can you bring that one step further with--in terms of Mayor Daley and the movement?
ED MARCINIAK: Well, the, the, the mayor, the city council had accepted in law the principle of fair housing. The, the only issue then was how do we achieve it? And how do we achieve it within that double policy of, that I, I referred to which is the right of everybody to buy or rent, and secondly, prevent the racial succession neighborhoods from all-W- White to all-Black. And that was, how do you do that? And certainly the, ah, the marches had the impact of scaring off people who were, who would not object to a Black as a neighbor, because I don't want my kids walking to school in all this violence. I don't like to see this hate.
SHEILA C. BERNARD: OK. Can we cut. This is the time when I get to ask you--